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1.1 The context of the research 
The activity of citizens is an important precondition for building a democratic society in 
any country, because stability and quality of democratic government relies on participa-
tory citizens (Levinson 2010, 327). There are many terms used in academic literature to 
name the process in which citizens attempt to influence on political decision-making or, 
in other words, decision-making related to the issues of common life organization in a 
society. The present study uses the term “political participation”, as the most encom-
passing term to nominate the process mentioned above.  
The global wave of democratization in the 1990s has dramatically increased the role 
of citizenry in many countries, particularly, in Eastern Europe (Dalton & Klingemann 
2007, 18). In some states, the actions of citizens were the one of main driving forces 
behind the collapse of authoritarian regimes. In other countries, democratization opened 
up a public sphere for the development of civil society. (Wnuk-Lipinski 2007, 683.) As 
some scholars claim, the future evolution of political participation in so-called new de-
mocracies is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, because in the world of 
global television, greater knowledge about politics, and fundamentally different elec-
torates, it is unlikely to follow the pattern of earlier democratization periods (Dalton & 
Klingemann 2007, 12). 
Russia was one of those countries, where citizens in the 1990s got more civic rights 
than they used to have before. After the breakup of the Soviet Union (USSR) democrat-
ic attributes were added to the political system in Russia, namely: right to create parties, 
vote at elections, create social associations, organize demonstrations etc. The following 
decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union was characterized by the rapid growth of 
civic participation in Russia. Later on, in 2000s, there was more state regulation and 
control over political participation, for example, new NGOs legislation was imposed. 
However, in general the governmental control over civic actions was not totally block-
ing the evolution of citizens’ activities. In the past years, a number of events, showing 
that civil society is evolving and becoming more active, can be observed in Russia, for 
example: protests, the occupation of public spaces, growing numbers of volunteers at 
elections, increased political Internet activity etc. In-line with the global trend of large-
scale protests (such as Occupy Wall Street in New York and Occupy movements in dif-
ferent European countries) Russia has also experienced a series of big demonstrations 
after parliament elections at the end of 2011 (this issue is regarded in more details in 
Chapter 4). This was a “wild card” for Russia as there were no such large-scale demon-
strations since the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
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Historical evolution of political participation interplays with new driving forces en-
tering the scene. Thus, Internet and social media change the way people communicate 
with each other and with the government, allowing mass communication and bringing 
more transparency to the social and political life. The new forms of people’s self-
organization, where information technology played a leading role, became visible in the 
recent years not only in relation to political protests. Another example was the activity 
of volunteers, helping citizens who suffered after a flood in Krymsk town in 2012. 
Apart from that, there are numerous examples of people collecting money via Internet 
for somebody who needs serious surgery or cancer treatment and cannot get help from 
the state medicine. The present time is also the period when new post-USSR generation 
are now at their 20s and younger and slowly are becoming active on political and social 
arena.  
Overall, the new driving forces make the future of political participation more uncer-
tain in a 10-year perspective. The current work uses futures studies approach to con-
struct scenarios of how political participation may look like in Russia in the coming 
decade. 
There have been projects studying similar topics, for example studies of the future of 
civil society by Carnegie UK Trust (2007b) and World Economic Forum (2013). How-
ever, these studies were focused primarily on western countries with no attention to 
Russia. The current master’s thesis attempts to narrow this research gap and get closer 
look on Russia. Moreover, the study presents a holistic view on political participation, 
by considering various forms of political participation as a single set. 
1.2 Aims of the research 
The general aim for the current study is to describe the future scenarios for citizens’ 
political participation
1
 in Russia by the year 2025. The following two aspects are be in 
research focus as components of the future of political participation: 
1. The future forms of political participation. Which traditional forms will re-
main and which new forms can potentially emerge in the future? Which 
forms of political participation will dominate in different scenarios? 
2. Relationships between citizens and the state. What are possible relationships 
of between citizens and the state in different scenarios? 
The current study aims at projecting the future till 2025. The choice of this year is 
conditioned by two major factors: political and economic.  
                                                 
1
 The concept of “political participation” is elaborated in Chapter 3. 
9 
One factor is political – the year 2024 should be the end of the (potentially) second 
term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency which has started in 2012 after a 4-year break. Ac-
cording to Russian Constitution, the same president cannot rule the country for more 
than two terms in a row, which means that someone should replace Vladimir Putin on 
this position in 2024 the latest. At the moment there is no single strong candidate for the 
next president, while he or she has to be identified within the next 5-10 years. For this 
reason, a lot of political struggles in the society are expected exactly in the period up to 
2025, and citizens can be involved in the process of struggle.   
The second factor is economic. In 2013 the growth of Russian GDP has slowed 
down: according to the head of the Ministry of Economic Development – Alexey 
Uljukaev, GDP of Russian economy increased by 1.4% in 2013 in comparison to 3.4% 
in 2012 and 4.3% in 2011 (ITAR-TASS 2013). According to the forecast for Russian 
economy (based on consensus of estimation provided by 21 experts from Russia and 
other countries), prepared by the Institute “Center of development” of the National Re-
search University – Higher School of Economics, economic expectations for Russia up 
to 2022 became pessimistic: the GDP growth in the years 2014-2022 is expected to re-
main in the range from 2.1% to 3% maximum (Center of development at NRU-HSE 
2013, 4). Mikhail Khazin, one of the well-known Russian economic analysts (who is 
currently in the opposition to the Russian Government policies), gives even more pes-
simistic forecast, claiming that GDP growth in Russia will be negative already by the 
end of 2013 and that is the beginning of the economic decline, which will be slowly 
becoming worse under condition that economic policy in Russia will remain the same 
(Navigator-Kirov Business Portal 2013). Later on, in 2014 economic crisis became visi-
ble deepened also because of sanctions, imposed on Russia after events in Crimea in 
spring of 2014. In all, there is evidence to expect that the next decade will be less suc-
cessful for Russia than the previous one. This fact can lead to the decline of the fall of 
living standards, together with social and political unrest. 
The arguments provided above, show that the following decade will be the time 
when significant political, economic and social changes are possible in Russia. On the 
other hand, the year 2025 is close enough to make any meaningful projections. 
1.3 Project steps and structure of the thesis 
The Figure 1 presents a flow chart, where all steps of the present study are shown.  
10 
 
Figure 1 Steps in the project execution 
The structure of the master’s thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 describes characteristics of the central research methods of the study.  
The following Chapters (3-5) are largely based on a literature review and refer to 
steps 1 and 2 in the flowchart shown above. Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework 
for the study: it defines the main concepts and operationalization of these concepts. 
Chapter 4 analyses trends, related to the scope of the study, happening in the past years 
globally and in Russia particularly. Chapter 5 identifies driving forces, which could im-
pact on the future of political participation.  
Chapter 6 focuses on practical issues of how Delphi study was conducted in the pro-
ject and the approach to the analysis of its results. Chapter 7 uses information, obtained 
in the previous steps of the project realization, to build four scenarios for the future of 
political participation in Russia in 2014-2025 years.  
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the whole topic and assesses the research in terms of 
the research validity, credibility and possible topic for the future research. 
Step 1 
• Literature review, operationalization of main concepts 
• Outcome of the step: getting input for a Delphi study 
Step 2 
• Literature review, identification of diving forces 
• Outcome of the step: getting input for a Delphi study 
Step 3 
• Delphi study round 1: Questionaire and interviews 
Step 4 
• Preparation of the 1st round summary feedback report 
Step 5 
• Delphi study round 2: Questionaire 
Step 6 
• Analysis of Delphi study results  
• Outcome of the step: getting input for building scenarios 
Step 7 
• Creating scenarios 
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2 CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH METHODS 
The present research aims at studying alternative futures of citizens’ political participa-
tion in Russia. One of the most appropriate ways to describe alternative futures is the 
form of scenario narrative. The chapter characterizes the futures studies approach in 
general, describes main features of scenarios as a futures studies method, explains the 
role of Delphi in scenario building and focuses on characteristics of Delphi method.      
2.1 Futures studies approach 
The present study is performed within the futures studies discipline. Lombardo (2008) 
defines futures studies in a broad sense as “an empirical and scientifically based ap-
proach to understanding the future”. The future itself is multidimensional matter and a 
futures study is also a very interdisciplinary subject integrating different dimensions of 
human life: technological, environmental, social, economic, cultural etc. (Lombardo 
2008, 109, 146.).  
Futures’ thinking is not aimed at predicting the future, instead, it accepts that no sin-
gle future exists and the role of futurists is to create “new, alternative images of the fu-
ture, visionary explorations of the possible, systematic investigation of the probable, 
and moral evaluation of the preferable”. Understanding the future is essential for en-
hancing decision-making and moreover it enables people to create their own preferable 
future. (Lombardo 2008, 144-145.) 
Futures research targeted on decision-making and futures studies conducted for aca-
demic purposes have different approaches. Futures research for decision-making pur-
poses is focused on a concrete decision which someone has to make, while academic 
futures studies are more subject-oriented or question-oriented. For example, they can 
answer such questions as “What are the critical technologies that will have the greatest 
influence over the next 25 years?” (Glenn, n/a (a), 2.)  
The present research can be classified as an academic futures research, focused on a 
particular subject rather than a particular decision. While the study takes futures studies 
perspective into account, it does not aim at predicting the future of political participa-
tion in Russia, but instead it aims at exploring possible, probable and preferable future 
alternatives.  
The tools for achievement of the research goal are two futures studies techniques: 
scenarios and Delphi method.  
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2.2 Scenarios: general characteristics and main steps 
The term “scenario” originates from dramatic arts, particularly from theater (Glenn, n/a 
(b), 1). Scenarios first emerged as a method of military planning after the World War II 
and were used for business-planning in 1960s by Herman Kahn (Schwartz 1996, 7). 
Later on, due to the successful work of Pierre Wack, who envisioned the oil crisis of 
1973 through the scenario-building process, the popularity of scenarios in business-
planning increased (Schwartz 1996, 7-9). Nowadays, scenarios are often used in strate-
gic planning, policy analysis, innovation development in any field having highly uncer-
tain futures.  
In the futures studies context, scenario implies a plausible description of what might 
happen in the future and how that could emerge from the present with an illustration of 
key decisions, events and consequences (Glenn, n/a (a), 2). As Schwartz (1996) claims, 
scenario method is a method used to reduce the level of uncertainty. 
In the most general sense scenario can be understood as a product of futures research, 
“a way of summarizing the results of futures research” (Bell 2009, 316). However, sce-
nario can be also understood as a specific method, which is used for a certain purposes 
with a defined technique.  
Glenn argues that it is necessary to differentiate scenarios from similar forms of fu-
tures thinking. Firstly, the discussion of the range of possibilities with data and analysis 
is not the same as scenarios. Secondly, scenarios should be distinguished from projec-
tions produced by computer models. Thirdly, scenarios do not present a prediction or a 
forecast of the future. Instead, Glenn characterizes scenario as “a way of organizing 
many statements about the future”, “a plausible description of what might occur and 
how that could emerge from the present”, description of “events and trends as they 
could evolve”. (Glenn, n/a (b), 2.) 
Glenn writes that the term “scenario” in practice is used in two different ways. The 
first option is a description of a situation at a certain time (a snapshot), while the second 
option is the description of a “future history” presenting the “evolution from present 
conditions to one of several futures” (Glenn, n/a (b), 4). From this perspective the “fu-
ture history” approach is more preferred than the “snapshot” approach (Glenn, n/a (b), 
4.) To name the “snapshot” approach the term “futures images” is often used (see, for 
example, Rubin & Linturi 2001; Morgan 2002; van der Helm 2009; Rubin 2013).  
Scenarios are usually presented in sets, under the assumption that future cannot be 
certainly known and thus several alternative futures are possible. (Glenn, n/a (b), 3.) 
There are different types of scenarios which can be included in a set. For example, 
Ratcliffe (2000, 133) presents the following dimensions of scenarios: 
 “Status quo”. In this type of scenario it is assumed that the present situation 
will continue to exist in the future. 
13 
 “Collapse”. Implies that the system will not be able to sustain continued 
growth and will ultimately crash. 
 “Steady state”. Means the return to a state (imagined or real) which will be 
quieter, slower, less commercial, industrialized or less populated. 
 “Transformation”. Assume some fundamental change (spiritual, technologi-
cal, political or economic). 
Another (but similar) typology was presented by Dator (2009) in his conception of 
generic alternative future scenarios. The alternative future scenarios, identified by Dator 
include the following categories: “Continued growth”, “Collapse”, “Disciplined Socie-
ty” and “Transformational Society” (Dator 2009, 8-10). 
Glenn identifies two major types of scenarios: exploratory and normative scenarios. 
Exploratory scenarios describe events and trends as they could evolve based on alterna-
tive assumptions on how these events and trends may influence the future. Normative 
scenarios describe how a desirable future can emerge from the present status quo 
(Glenn, n/a (b), 3).  
Though, the typologies, described above, are frequently used, the variety of possible 
scenarios cannot be grasped by a single typology. For this reason, there is no agreement 
in the futures studies community that a set of scenarios should always include certain 
types of scenarios. For the purposes of the current study the dichotomy explorato-
ry/normative is the most appropriate. Scenarios in the study can be classified as explora-
tory.   
The account of purposes for which scenarios can be used is given by Glenn (n/a (b), 
4). The possible purposes of scenario use are versatile, namely:  
 To catalog what is unknown that ought to be known, before making deci-
sions;  
 To understand the significance of uncertainties;  
 To illustrate what is possible and what is not possible; 
 To identify what strategies might work across a range of possible scenarios;  
 To dichotomize strategies between robust and contingent elements;  
 To make the future more real for decision makers to force new thinking and 
decisions; 
 To learn how to be prepared for future risks and uncover new opportunities. 
In essence, a scenario is a story about the future, and scenarios (in plural) present dif-
ferent alternatives of the future development. As Schwartz (1996, xiii) puts it: “Scenari-
os are narrative stories in which equally plausible futures are considered in depth”. 
Kahn and Weiner (1967) define scenarios as narrative descriptions of the future that 
focus attention on causal processes and decision points. Therefore, futurists emphasize 
the importance of narrative in scenarios.  
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As Schwartz (1996) writes, people usually expect serious information to be presented 
in graphs and figures. This is an attitude which developed since the rise of scientific 
philosophy during the Enlightenment (before that stories dominated as a way to organ-
ize knowledge). However, nowadays, as soon as the world is becoming more complex, 
ways to organize of complex knowledge, such as story narrative, are becoming more 
demanded again. Through stories it is possible to explain meanings of events, their 
causes and effects, present issues from different points of view, to give order to events. 
(Schwartz 1996, 37-39) 
Glenn gives the following three criteria of a “good scenario” (Glenn, n/a (b), 3): 
1. Plausibility: presenting a plausible route from present to the future, explain-
ing causes and effects. 
2. Internal consistency, meaning that different scenarios within one set of sce-
narios should address similar issues and could be compared. 
3. Interesting and exciting to present the future real enough. 
As Glenn writes, practically there are many different methods of scenarios creation 
which are used by different actors, however, “most approaches recognize the need to 
understand the system under study and identify the trends, issues, driving forces, and 
potential events that are critical to this system.” (Glenn, n/a (b), 5.) Similarly, Schwartz 
highlights the necessity to define the key factors and driving forces affecting the subject 
under study. His book “The art of the long view” identifies the following eight main 
steps in scenario-building (Schwartz 1996, 241-247): 
1. Identification of a focal issue or a decision. 
2. Listing key factors influencing a success or failure of this decision. 
3. Listing driving forces of macro-environment that influence key factors, iden-
tified previously. This step requires research, covering various factors: politi-
cal, technological, economic etc.  
4. Ranking factors by degree of importance for the focal issue or decision, and 
the degree of uncertainty. Schwartz divides factors into predetermined ele-
ments and key uncertainties.  
5. Scenario logic selection. 
6. Fleshing out the scenarios. 
7. Defining implications of each scenario for the focal issue or decision. 
8. Selection of leading indicators and signposts.  
Scenario building process is a “team exercise” (Ratcliffe 2000, 137). The team work 
can be organized in a form of workshop. For example, Ralston and Wilson (2006) in 
their book give concrete guidelines how to organize a scenario workshop. Ratcliffe 
(2000, 141) also gives a list of methods which can be involved in the process of creation 
scenarios, namely: 
 The Delphi technique; 
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 Cross-impact matrices; 
 Teamwork techniques (for example, brainstorming); 
 Environmental scanning; 
 Systems thinking; 
 Network analysis; 
 Simulation modeling. 
In addition, Tapio, Paloniemi, Varho & Vinnari (2011b, 1617) also mention Delphi 
method as a futures studies method which can be used for scenarios-building.  
Scenarios are widely used in practical work of the government and corporations, be-
cause they bring a number of benefits. Thus Ratcliffe (2000, 132) mentions that the pro-
cess of building scenarios facilitates organizational learning, enhances decision-makers’ 
understanding of change and prepares them to manage this change, increases conscious-
ness of uncertainty, demonstrates how organization could thrive in different future envi-
ronments. Glenn writes that scenarios are one of the easiest ways to make future possi-
bilities more real for decision-makers and test decisions in multiple futures. (Glenn, n/a 
(b), 18.) However, limitations of the method should be kept in mind.  
Scenario building process is especially useful for its participants. However, when the 
set of scenarios is given to a non-participant, the fact of having a described set of possi-
ble future alternatives may limit thinking of such person, due to latent cause and effect 
embedded into scenarios. Efforts to make an exciting story may lead to the exclusion of 
boring details therefore the logic of the writer may become less understandable. (Glenn, 
n/a (b), 18.) 
As mentioned by Ratcliffe (2000) and Tapio et al. (2011b), Delphi method can be 
used in the process of scenario-building. The present study follows this approach and 
incorporates Delphi in the process. Thus, it is important to describe the general charac-
teristics of the method. 
2.3 Delphi: general characteristics and main steps 
Delphi method will be used to collect data as a basis for scenarios-building. Delphi is a 
method of controlled group discussion in which experts from different disciplines could 
be asked to participate (Gordon, n/a). It is organized on a number of principles (such as, 
anonymity of participants, consecutive rounds of inquiry and feedback between the 
rounds) which make a group discussion outcome more effective and open to new per-
spectives.  
Linstone and Turoff (2002, 3) define Delphi as “a method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individu-
als, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.” The group communication is usually 
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structured by means of a questionnaire and a certain procedure of measurement and re-
measurement of respondents’ opinions. An element of communication in Delphi process 
comes from providing to each participant a feedback, summary of the group view and 
an opportunity to revise answers. (Linstone & Turoff 2002, 3.)   
Anonymity is one of the basic principles of a Delphi method. Participants do not 
know who is involved in a study, do not physically meet each other and cannot attach 
given arguments to a concrete person. This principle helps to avoid influence of partici-
pants’ individual status on responses. 
The idea behind the Delphi method originates from surveys in social sciences, where 
a practice of pretests and posttests, as well as panel studies exists. In principle, Delphi 
method is a version of a survey study. (Bell 2009, 261-262.) According to Okoli and 
Pawlowski (2004), Delphi study and traditional survey have similar issues in question-
naire design. However, there are significant differences between a traditional survey and 
Delphi as well (for example, Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) provided a detailed compari-
son between Delphi and survey).  
Below, the most important differences are outlined, based on Okoli and Pawlowski 
(2004) analysis.  Firstly, a traditional survey is a sample survey where sample is repre-
sentative for a studied population and participants are selected according to this sample. 
Participants in a Delphi study are experts in a certain issue, do not represent the general 
population and are recruited without random sampling. (Okoli and Pawlowski 2004, 
19.) Secondly, in a traditional survey a sample size should be big enough to conduct 
statistical analysis, while the size of Delphi group can be relatively small, Okoli and 
Pawlowski mention that recommended size of the group is 10-18 participants. Results 
of the Delphi study cannot be regarded as statistically significant. (Okoli and Pawlowski 
2004, 19.) Thirdly, in a traditional survey, construct validity is achieved through an ac-
curate questionnaire design and pre-testing. It is also true for a Delphi study however 
Delphi method allows further construct validation by asking experts for their validation 
in the process of the study. (Okoli and Pawlowski 2004, 19.)         
Delphi method is extensively used in Futures Studies, though it is also applicable for 
other purposes than forecasting. Linstone and Turoff highlighted several conditions un-
der which Delphi can be an effective method. Among such conditions are: the investiga-
tion of a broad complex problem, the possibility to benefit from subjective judgments 
on a collective basis, need for more individuals than can effectively interact face-to-
face, frequent face-to-face group meetings are impossible due to time and cost reasons, 
crucial disagreements between individuals etc. (Linstone & Turoff 2002, 4.) All these 
conditions hold as to the future of political participation in Russia. 
Bell described eight basic steps in conducting a Delphi study, though variations can 
exist (Bell 2009, 262-263):  
1. Framing the topic, the future of which is investigated. 
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2. Designing a questionnaire for data collection. 
3. The selection of respondents, whose opinions will be studied. Usually ex-
perts in the field are invited to participate in a study as respondents. 
4. Conducting the first round: measurement of respondents’ opinions by means 
of questionnaire. 
5. Summarization of data collected in the first round and preparation a feedback 
report. 
6. Communication of the first round results as a feedback to respondents. 
7. Conducting the second round: re-measurement of respondents’ opinions. It is 
assumed that respondents may have changed their opinions after they got 
feedback on the first round results. 
8. Final data analysis and interpretation, report preparation and presentation of 
results.    
The sequence of steps described by Bell is basic and in practice it is possible to con-
duct more than two rounds. In this case, the re-measurement of opinions and the feed-
back of results can be repeated as many times as it is necessary.  
Alternatively to questionnaires, it is possible to use in-depth interviews or group on-
line meetings (Gordon, n/a, 6). Linstone and Turoff, differentiate two types of Delphi: 
“conventional” or “paper-and-pencil” version performed by means of a traditional ques-
tionnaire, and “real-lucre” or “conference Delphi”, which is organized as a real-time on-
line communication process (Linstone & Turoff 2002, 5).  
Delphi study involves experts in a studied issue as respondents. The reason behind 
utilizing expert opinions for making a forecast is that experts are more likely to be cor-
rect about questions in the field of their expertise than non-experts (Gordon, n/a, 1). 
The number of participants for the Delphi study can be small as Delphi is not meant 
to produce a statistically significant result (it does not forecast the response of a larger 
population). Instead, it is important to select knowledgeable participants, those who 
could propose valuable ideas. (Gordon, n/a, 7.) The selection of participants is a critical 
factor of Delphi success. Therefore, the problem of forming a good group is extremely 
actual for Delphi method (Linstone & Turoff 2002, 7).  
Knowledgeable persons can be searched through the review of scientific publications 
search, recommendations from institutions and “daisy chaining”. The matrix of required 
skills can be used in order to make sure that people with all needed important skills are 
involved. In addition, so-called “unknown” people could be invited into study, those 
people who are “outside of the normal lines of communication but who may be able to 
contribute new and innovative ideas”. (Gordon, n/a, 7.)     
Since it was used for the first time in the early 1950s, Delphi method was aimed at 
reaching a consensus among experts on a certain issue, and originally was frequently 
used for technological forecasting (Linstone & Turoff 2002, 10-11). However, later on 
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Delphi started to be used for policy issues, where it was more important to address op-
posing views rather than find a consensus. This type of Delphi is usually called policy 
Delphi. The policy Delphi is based under assumption that “the decision maker is not 
interested in having a group generate his decision; but rather, have an informed group 
present all the options and supporting evidence for his consideration” (Turoff 2002, 80-
81). 
Being a method of identifying various expert views on the topic, policy Delphi is an 
appropriate basis for scenarios-building. This approach was used, for example, by Tapio 
(2002) and Tapio, Kohl, Tikkanen and Salonen (2011a). Tapio operates with the term 
“Disaggregative policy Delphi” and uses cluster analysis as a tool for grouping opinions 
and uses these groups further in scenario formation (Tapio 2002). 
2.4 Summary of the study approach 
The current project is not directly related to decision-making, but instead it is aimed 
at the general exploration of how the trends existing in the present could evolve in the 
future. In other words, the study aims at building exploratory scenarios rather than nor-
mative scenarios. Therefore, the list of scenario-building steps, given in the Chapter 2.2, 
based on Schwartz’ approach, should be transformed according to the actual needs of 
the study. The most important change relates to the exclusion of the focus on a certain 
practical decision from the agenda. As a result, the scenario-building plan for the cur-
rent project looks as follows:    
1. Defining the studied issue (political participation). 
2. Listing driving forces of the macro-environment that influence the issue. 
3. Ranking factors by degree of importance for the issue, and the degree of un-
certainty.  
4. Scenario logic selection. 
5. Fleshing out the scenarios. 
The second and the third steps of scenario building will involve analysis of different 
secondary information sources, such as publications in scientific papers and in the me-
dia, reports, and books. This information will serve as an input for an expert study. Pri-
mary data on expert opinions (about possible drivers for the future of civil society and 
possible future outcomes) will be the core material in scenario building process. Delphi 
method will be used as a way to gather and synthesize expert opinions for further sce-
nario building. Particularly, the sub-type of a Delphi method, called Disaggregative pol-
icy Delphi will be used in the research. 
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The present study does not aim to build scenarios according to a pre-defined scenario 
typology. The number and the content of scenarios will be defined after the analysis on 
experts’ responses. 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach of the study and basic meth-
odological characteristics of Scenarios as a method and a Delphi method. The Chapter 6 
elaborates more on Delphi aims, design and approach to data analysis in this particular 
study. The Chapter 7 will deal scenario building on the basis of Delphi study results. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Before proceeding to the Delphi study and scenario building, it is important to define 
the main concepts used in the research. The research object in the study is the involve-
ment of citizens into social and political activity, as well as their influence on political 
decision-making. This phenomenon has been studied in multiple academic works; how-
ever, there is no a single consensus term used to describe it. Most frequently scholars 
apply terms “participation” or “engagement”, with such additions as “civic”, “political”, 
“civil”, “social” etc. The chapter provides an overview of such terms and their defini-
tions, together with classification of various participation/engagement forms. In addi-
tion, the chapter provides conceptualizations of relationships between citizens and state.  
Sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.2 regard the central concepts of the study: “political participa-
tion” and classification of state-society relationships models. Sub-chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 
3.5 elaborate several important aspects on the theoretical framework, used in the current 
study. 
3.1 Political participation: definitions and classifications 
Among western scholars, the discussion on political participation and civic engage-
ment was revived in the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s. It was conditioned by 
the decline of political participation (particularly, voter turnout) and growing distrust in 
institutions observed in western established democracies (see, for example, Wattenberg 
2002). As a result, a growing number of publications have studied political behavior, 
political participation and civic engagement. 
The book by Putnam (2000) “Bowling Alone” analyzed the concept of civic en-
gagement and promoted the concept in the academic field. After this publication, a 
number of scholars, have published studies on the topic (e.g. van Deth 2001; Norris 
2002; Adler and Goggin 2005; Teorell, Torcal and Montero 2007; Berger 2009). De-
spite multiple scientific works devoted to the subject, a number of scholars note that 
there is a conceptual confusion in definition of engagement (see, for example, Adler and 
Goggin 2005, Campbell 2006, Berger 2009, Ekman and Amnå 2012). 
There have been done several attempts by different scholars to define the concept 
more clearly and systematize forms of participation/engagement. Thus, Campbell 
(2006) proposed a classification for “civic and social engagement”, which included the 
seven dimensions of engagement most commonly-discussed in the literature. Later on, 
Brodie, Cowling and Nissen (2009) studied the involvement of citizens in various forms 
of participation. Another classification was proposed by Ekman and Amnå (2012). 
They analyzed existing theoretical frameworks of political participation and civic en-
21 
gagement and proposed the new framework for the analysis of different forms of social 
and political engagement.  
All three classifications of political participation forms mentioned above imply that 
the concept of political participation is broader than the “classic” understanding of polit-
ical participation forms (as voter turnout and participation in political parties). Thus, 
Campbell regards “voter turnout” and “political participation” as two separate catego-
ries within the comprehensive phenomenon of social and civic engagement. Ekman & 
Amnå propose the category “manifest political participation” within which they distin-
guish “formal political participation” (including voting) and “extra parliamentary politi-
cal participation”. Along with the “manifest political participation” there is “latent polit-
ical participation”, which is realized through social connections within a community, 
individual and collective actions, which are not aimed to influence directly on govern-
ment decision-making. 
The framework developed by Ekman and Amnå appears to be the most up-to-date 
and well elaborated among all three classifications and will be used in developing a 
working classification for the current research project.   
When elaborating their framework, Ekman and Amnå (2012) critically review the 
existing theoretical concepts. Scholars pointed out that “civic engagement” concept 
shows an example of conceptual stretching across various literature sources (Ekman & 
Amnå 2012, 284), meaning that scholars usually include “a bit of everything” in it. 
Therefore, the concept it its current state is not very useful for empirical studies. The 
concept of “political participation”, according to them, suffers from an opposite prob-
lem – being too restrictive. In the post-war tradition of political science, “political par-
ticipation” was understood as influence of citizens on selection of governmental per-
sonnel, therefore, associated only with electoral participation. Only later, political scien-
tists admitted that citizens may participate in political life between the elections, too. 
The recent definitions regard “political participation” as actions of ordinary people that 
are in some ways directed at influencing political outcomes in society. However even in 
this extended definition, many non-traditional, latent forms of political participation 
were not included in the concept. By these latent forms of participation they mean ac-
tions, which cannot be directly classified as political participation, but still, may have 
consequences for politics. (Ekman & Amnå 2012, 287-288.) 
By describing problems existing around current usage of concepts “political partici-
pation” and “civic engagement”, Ekman and Amnå aim to prove the need for a new, 
improved theoretical framework. The new typology, mapping the forms of civic en-
gagement and political participation, proposed by scholars, is shown in Table 1.  
The typology presented in Table 1 is based on following dimensions: latent vs. mani-
fest forms of participation, individual vs. collective forms of participation. Manifest 
political participation implies all actions, which are goal-oriented, aimed at influencing 
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governmental decisions. These actions are mostly observable. However, scholars em-
phasize that people engage in a society in a number of other ways, therefore, it is not 
enough to analyze only manifest forms of activity (Ekman & Amnå 2012, 291).  
Scholars present the category of civil participation (latent forms of political partici-
pation) as an innovation in studies of political participation. It is claimed that these ac-
tions can be also observable, but they are latent in relation to political parliamentary 
actions. Civil participation is divided into two categories: 
 Civic engagement, meaning activities by ordinary citizens, which are intend-
ed to affect conditions in society that are related to others, outside their own 
family and friends (Ekman & Amnå 2012, 287).  
 Social involvement implies interest in politics and considered as preceding 
civic and political engagement. This category is included in the framework, 
firstly, because it is a basic condition for other types of involvement and, sec-
ondly, due to better differentiation from the concept of “civic engagement” 
(Ekman & Amnå 2012, 293).    
Finally, apart from various forms of civic and political engagement/participation, 
Ekman and Amnå proposed to include the category of “disengagement” into considera-
tion.  
The working operationalization of “political participation” concept, described in the 
concluding sub-chapter 3.6, will be based on the typology of citizens’ participation 
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3.2 Relationships between the society and the state 
One of the research questions in the present work relates to forms in which citizens will 
be able to influence the decision-making, social and political life in Russia in the future. 
For this purpose, the term “political participation” (which includes the variety of partic-
ipation forms) is used. Another research question focuses on relationships between citi-
zens and the state. In this formulation of the research question the attention is shifted 
from participation forms as such towards the subject of participation (who participates). 
When we are talking about the subject of participation or the actor, the term “civil socie-
ty” is appropriate to use. The term is regarded in details in the sub-chapter 3.4.  
According to one of its definitions (see sub-chapter 3.4) civil society consists of the 
set of associations, which perform certain activity independently from the business or 
the state, aimed at influencing the life in the country. Therefore, in the present paper 
when we speak about the relationships between the society and the state, the term “civil 
society” will be used to describe an actor(s) from the side of the society in these rela-
tionships.    
Jakobson (2008) claims that civil society and the state are not competitors. In con-
tract theories of the state, the state is considered as the product of consensus in civil 
society. Ideally, the state is the synopsis of goals and values of civil society. In addition, 
the state is the main tool for achieving goals of civil society. Jakobson (2008, 32-33.) 
However, in the modern understanding of civil society, especially in societies of the 
Eastern Europe, civil society is opposed to the state. Partly, the reason is coming from 
the history, particularly from the first step of the concept development discussed above, 
when civil society was opposed to the state. On the other hand, the reason is coming 
from the fact of breakup of communist systems with strong states. 
Generally, there are three main models of relationships between civil society and the 
state: cooperative partnership, ignoring (no relationships) and confrontation to 
(Jakobson 2008, 212). Each of these models can be broken down into several more con-
crete sub-types of models. 
1) The first one, the model of cooperative partnership includes: 
 Model of support. In this model legislation favors the emergence of NGOs and 
government undertakes concrete actions to support them.  
 Affiliate model. Government understands the importance of civil society for 
the effective democratic development. The state holds a dialogue with civil so-
ciety in different forms, but does not attempt to manage it. The state is open to 
learn the results of “social control” from the civil society.  
 Model of an architect. Civil society associations form political agenda, pro-
pose solutions for problems, propose and participate in reformations of gov-
ernmental institutions, teach and train government officials. 
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2) The second model is based on state dominance and includes the following sub-
models: 
 Paternalistic model. Government allows certain autonomy of civil society as-
sociations from the state and provides some support, under condition that these 
associations do not interfere into state affairs and support certain candidates 
during elections.  
 The model of “drive belts”. The state regards civil society associations as one 
of the means to perform control over the society. This model existed in the So-
viet Union in 1930-1970s when NGOs were a part of the system, fully con-
trolled by the state. 
3) The third is the model of ignorance. The state does not pay attention to civil so-
ciety associations. It does not interfere with their activities, but does not help as 
well. 
4) And finally, the model of confrontation includes: 
 The model of fight with an adversary. Government sees civil society associa-
tions as dangerous for the state and tries to make their life harder. For example, 
those NGOs which get funding from abroad are becoming for the state “foreign 
agents”.   
 The model of civil disobedience. When civic rights and freedoms are violated, 
civic associations and civic activists may start a tactic of civil disobedience: 
they take part in unsanctioned demonstrations and other actions which provoke 
repressive actions from the state.  
In reality, usually different models are present at the same time however it is possible 
to define a dominant model for a certain period of time.   
The typology of relationships between the civil society and the state used by 
Jakobson is quite full and will be used in the further research. 
3.3 Political Internet use 
Apart from general classifications of political participation, provided above, it is inter-
esting to elaborate on one of the most modern type of participation, which has emerged 
relatively recently, due to the development of information technologies – Internet politi-
cal participation. 
Growing Internet penetration is the one of the megatrends nowadays. Various schol-
ars admit that Internet use has become political in many ways (see, for example, De 
Vreese 2007; Shah, Cho & Eveland 2005; Tedesco 2007). Among the latest papers is 
the paper by Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenthart and de Vreese (2013) presents classi-
fication of political Internet use forms. 
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It considers two general forms of political Internet use: passive and active use. Ac-
tive use includes those usage forms which enable interactive, double sided communica-
tion, whereas passive usage allows only one-sided communication. Concretely, the fol-
lowing forms of Internet usage are included in mentioned categories (Kruikemeier et al., 
2013 10): 
 Passive forms of political Internet usage: 
o Online news use; 
o Reading comments posted on an online political news article; 
o Follow activities about politics; 
o Visiting a party web-site; 
o Following a politician on Twitter. 
 Active forms of political Internet usage: 
o Posting comments on an on-line political news article; 
o Participating in activities about politics; 
o Vote Advice Application; 
o Signing an online petition; 
o Participation in an online discussion about politics; 
o Forwarding an e-mail, video or link containing political content; 
Thus, in the most general sense political Internet use can be classified into active and 
passive use. The passive usage forms imply mainly consumption of information about 
political and social issues through the Internet, while active usage forms imply commu-
nication with other users on a certain topic or expressing position in various ways. 
3.4 Civil society 
During the work on this project, the concept of civil society has arisen many times on 
the agenda, and the need for differentiating the concept of civic society from the con-
cept of political participation has been recognized.  
The thinking about civil society takes its origin at least from Aristotle (2009). Aristo-
tle’s “political community” may be regarded as the beginning of a long chain of ideas 
referring to the specific category of communities whose members possess the ability 
and the will to influence the ways in which community functions. (Wnuk-Lipinski 
2007, 676.)  
Jakobson (2008) identifies three steps of the development of civil society concept.  
Step 1: The concept of civil society was introduced to the social-philosophical dis-
course in the 17
th
 century by Lock and Harrington, and was developed afterwards in 
works of different authors. Initially, civil society was understood as an area of social 
relations and institutions which were united by the main characteristic – being outside 
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of the state. According to this understanding, any kind of relations outside the state was 
included there: a family, a group, religious, cultural, economic relations etc. Civil socie-
ty had a positive meaning as an area where people could reach personal fulfillment in 
contrast to ascriptive roles in feudalism. Capitalistic market was considered as the part 
of civil society. (Jakobson 2008, 11-18.) 
Step 2: When capitalism entered (in the beginning – middle of 19
th
 century) an in-
dustrial stage, it started to have more negative associations, for example, an association 
with exploitation. Capitalism, which before was considered to be a positive phenome-
non, showed its dark side, and began to be criticized by many thinkers. Independence 
and individualism turned to lead to poverty, social inequality and breakup of social con-
nections. This reevaluation of capitalism has lead to the second step in the transfor-
mation of civil society concept. (Jakobson 2008, 11-18.) 
On this step of its development the civil society concept was closely associated with 
opposing capitalism. In accordance with Marx, society, as a moral unity and solidarity, 
was killed by capitalism. Under this logic, civil society as an independent society was 
considered to be killed by capitalism and reduced to a civic “superstructure”. Only con-
nections existing in working class may help to restore the broken social connections, 
according to Marx. At that time (mid-19
th
 century) civil society almost disappeared 
from the discourse. More attention of scholars was brought to the state, while bureau-
cratic regulation was thought of as the main mechanism of compensating instabilities 
and inhumanity of market processes. This way of thinking was dominant during almost 
a century in social sciences. (Jakobson 2008, 11-18.) 
Step 3: The third step is continuing during the two decades, beginning from the col-
lapse of the communist bloc. Civil society began to be understood as a separate social 
sphere. This change in thinking has been connected with changes happening in the 
world, particularly, with breakup of communist systems. On this stage civil society is 
understood as a social sphere (sub-system of the society) which is analytically and, to a 
certain extent, empirically independent from the state and the market, and also from 
some other spheres of life (such as religion), and exists under different rules and princi-
ples. According to Habermas and Claus Offe, the role of civil society is creation of so-
cial solidarity through communication. (Jakobson 2008, 11-18.) 
Nowadays, there is no a single, agreed on definition of civil society, instead – there 
are many different approaches to define it. Civil society can be thought of in various 
forms: 
 In the most general sense, civil society exists everywhere where there is a room 
for the existence of free associations which are independent from the state con-
trol. From this point of view, the elements of civil society can exist even in a 
non-democratic environment (Wnuk-Lipinski 2007, 678). It includes formal 
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and informal associations, participation in which is voluntary in nature (Carne-
gie UK Trust 2007b, 5). 
 Civil society can be thought of as the “good society”. Civil society is often de-
fined as a kind of society we want to live in, assuming that it is a good thing. A 
“good society” is not achieved by associations alone. It is achieved through co-
operation between associations, government and business. (Carnegie UK Trust 
2007b, 5.) 
 And finally, civil society can be considered as arenas for public deliberation. In 
this dimension civil society is again understood as a “space” – a public space, 
physical or virtual, where social problems, governmental policies, matters of 
community are debated and developed. (Carnegie UK Trust 2007b, 5.) 
Civil society includes formal and informal associations, for example, NGOs, on-line 
groups and activities, faith-based communities and organizations, labor unions, social 
entrepreneurs, grassroots associations, cooperatives and civic practices of individual 
citizens (World Economic Forum (2013, 8). However, civil society can be also regarded 
from the point of view of an individual, who is involved into civil society in different 
ways.  
Individuals are involved in civil society through social practices, such as volunteer-
ing, membership in NGOs, philanthropy (money donations) and civic activism. Homero 
Gil de Zuniga and Sebastian Valenzuela (2011, 399) use the term “civic participation” 
or “civic engagement” which is defined as voluntary civic activity. Voluntary civic ac-
tivity includes different kinds of activities: volunteering for non-political groups, raising 
money for charities, attending neighborhood meetings, and supporting responsibility of 
a corporation by buying its product or services.    
Overall, the concept “political participation” (in its broad sense, as regarded in the 
previous chapter) has similarities with the concept “civil society”. However, “political 
participation” implies mainly forms of participation, while “civil society” concept is 
more blurred and, depending on a context of usage, can have various meanings, such as: 
the abstractly identified sphere of society, value characteristic of a society, a set of civic 
associations, civic participation and civic engagement of an individual. Moreover, forms 
of participation in civil society, described above, do not cover all forms of political par-
ticipation as a broader concept. In this study we are interested in participation in a broad 
sense, including both pure “civic engagement” (with no direct aim to affect political 
decision-making) and also participation openly aiming at influencing political decision-
making, in other words, in both latent and manifest forms of participation. 
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3.5 Citizenship, participation, empowerment 
It is important to note that participation of citizens in social and political life is influ-
enced by existing understandings in the society of what is citizenship and how a “good 
citizen” should act (Dalton 2008, 78). 
The concept of citizenship has a long history and multiple meanings, depending on a 
philosophical school which defines it. Dalton (2008, 78-79) claims that there are four 
broad principles which any concept of citizenship includes: 
1. Citizenship implies public participation, meaning that a citizen participate 
either in deliberation of public policies or in free elections.  
2. Autonomy: citizens should be informed enough about policies and form 
their opinions independently. 
3.  “Good citizens” accept the rule of law and state legitimacy. 
4. Citizens have ethical and moral responsibility to other people.  
In addition, Dalton (2008, 81-82) describes the two types of citizenship, idea of 
which developed among American scholars. The first type of citizenship is citizenship 
based on duty. In this perspective, a “good citizen” is someone, who performs according 
to his duties, such as obeying the law, serving in a military, voting etc. This understand-
ing of citizenship emerged in industrialized societies and based on more traditional val-
ues. Along with transformations of western societies from industrialized to post-
industrialized, the different understanding of citizenship was born – engaged citizen. 
This type of citizenship is based on citizens’ engagement in voluntary activities, form-
ing opinions etc., in other words, more individualized and direct forms of action. En-
gaged citizenship overlaps with the patterns of post-material and self-expression values. 
Further on, Dalton states that certain civic norms underlie each of citizenship types. 
In turn, civic norms influence on civic engagement. (Dalton 2008, 86.). Thus, the de-
cline of duty-based norms leads to decline in voting participation and election turnout 
goes down. At the same time, rising engagement norms lead to the shift of political ac-
tion to more direct forms of participation. As a result, the balance of participation forms 
is changing. Some analysts claim that citizen participation is diminishing in the USA 
(for example, elections turnout is declining) and it is a dangerous sign for democracy. 
However, other analysts say that civic engagement is changing. More traditional, duty 
based forms of engagement (such as participation in elections) are declining, while 
forms based on engagement are becoming more popular. (Dalton 2008, 84-85.)  
Another scholar, Meira Levinson outlined in her paper qualities of responsible citi-
zens. According to her, responsible citizens (Levinson 2010, 317):  
1. Are informed and think critically; 
2. Participate in their communities through membership or contributions to or-
ganizations; 
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3. Have skills, knowledge and commitment to achieve public purposes, such as 
group problem-solving, public-speaking, petitioning, protesting and voting; 
4. Have moral and civic virtues (concern for rights and welfare of others, social 
responsibility, tolerance and respect, belief in the capacity to make a differ-
ence). 
Thus, this definition emphasizes the importance of knowledgeable, skillful and active 
involvement of citizens into civic activities. Levinson (2010) uses a term “civic empow-
erment” to describe the sufficient amount of skills, knowledge and abilities to partici-
pate in civic activities. She also notes that there can be a problem of “empowerment 
gap” in the society, meaning the difference in terms of knowledge, skills, behavior and 
participation between different groups of people, for example, between native citizens 
of the country and immigrants. “Empowerment gap” diminishes the quality of political 
system. (Levinson 2010, 328.) 
To sum up, people’s decision to participate in civic life can be partly determined by 
their civic attitudes or how they, as citizens, should act in a society. Should a good citi-
zen participate only during an election period by voting or as a party member (citizen-
ship based on duty) or participation is more flexible in forms and time (engaged citizen-
ship). In order to be an empowered citizen, a person should be informed, think critical-
ly, have necessary skills, be active in communities and have moral virtues.      
3.6 Operationalization of the main concepts 
During the past decades, in numerous publications on social/political engagement con-
fusion persisted in definitions of the concept. Scholars presented multiple visions on the 
forms of participation and their classification. For the sake of further research, it is im-
portant to develop a working definition of the subject and provide its operationalization.  
Ekman & Amnå, as well as researchers within the project “Pathways through partici-
pation”, mentioned that any type of citizens’ participation is, in the end, political partic-
ipation. The current study agrees with this statement and determines the object of the 
present study as “political participation”, which will be understood in a broad sense as 
activities of people, whose are living in the country, to influence social situation and 
political decision-making in this country. Politics is regarded as achieving social goals, 
and not related to struggle for power.  
Operationalization of the main concept, presented in the Table 2, is largely based on 
Ekman & Amna’s conceptual framework. However, the list of forms, included in the 
framework is shortened and differentiation between collective and individual participa-
tion is not used. The list of participation forms will be used further on in a Delphi ques-
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tionnaire therefore it is made possibly shorter, so it would be easier for experts to work 
with the list when answering questions.       
Following the logic of Ekman & Amnå, the basic distinction between manifest polit-
ical participation (formal and extra-parliamentary), latent political participation (atten-
tion and action) and non-participation will be used in the research.  
Table 2 Operationalization of the concept “political participation” 
“Political participation” (activities of people, whose are living in the country, to influence social situation 




Voting in elections and referenda (for a candidate 
or “blank voting”) 
Contacting politicians or their representatives 
(personally or through on-line forms of communi-
cation) 
Donating money for political parties or selected 
candidates 
Being a party member 




Political consumption (boycotting or boycotting) 
Signing petitions 
Involvement in new social movements 
Participation in peaceful demonstrations, protests, 
strikes and other actions 
Civil disobedience (intentional law violation 
aimed at attracting attention) 
Participation in violent demonstrations 
Latent political participa-
tion (civic participation) 
Attention 
Perceiving politics as important and following 
political news 
Identifying with a certain ideology or party 
Action 
Giving money to charity or NGOs 
Active interest in politics (discussions of political 
issues with others, active Internet political partici-
pation etc.) 
Short-term self-organization for solving social 
issues 
Membership in an NGO 




 Non-voting, perceiving politics as non-interesting 
To operationalize the relationships of civil society and the state, the classification, 
proposed by Jakobson will be used. Table 3 presents categories, based on Jakobson 
classification and the description of each category, which can be used in a Delphi ques-
tionnaire.  
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Table 3 Operationalization of relationship models between civil society and the 
state 
Category Sub-category Explanation 
Cooperative 
partnership  
The model of state 
support 
Government supports citizens’ activity through concrete 
actions (for example, legislation, education etc.) 
Dialog (or affiliate) 
model 
Government admits the importance of citizen’s political 
participation for the effective democratic development of 
the country, and maintains the dialog with citizens and 
citizens associations on a regular basis 
Citizens as architects 
Associations of citizens form political agenda, propose 




The state uses civic associations as the means to perform 
control over the society 
Confrontation The model of fight 
with an adversary 
Government sees active political participation as danger-
ous for the state and tries to make life of activists harder 
The model of civil 
disobedience 
Civic rights and freedoms are violated by the state, that’s 
why citizens take part in unsanctioned demonstrations and 
other actions which provoke repressive actions from the 
state 
No relationships 
The model of igno-
rance 
State does not pay attention to civic associations, as well 
as to civic and political participation. It does not interfere 
and does not help 
Independent citizens 
Citizens self-organize and perform social projects inde-
pendently and without control from the state. The state 
does not have means to control citizens. 
 
The only category, which is not taken from Jakobson’s classification is “independent 
citizens”, but originated from brainstorming and environmental scanning. The differ-
ence of this category from “the model of ignorance” is that it implies that the state can-
not control civic activities, while in “the model of ignorance” there is a voluntary deci-
sion of the state to ignore civil society.   
Both these classifications will be used in the design of questions in the Delphi ques-
tionnaire.  
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4 TRENDS IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In order to create scenarios for the future it is important to understand the system under 
investigation, its historical development and current development trends. This chapter 
focuses on the recent past and the present situation in political participation in Russia, 
on the basis of theoretical framework. As the country is an open system it is influenced 
by other countries, by global trends and events. Therefore, major global trends, as well 
as trends in western countries will be also observed in the chapter. 
4.1 Trends of political participation in western countries 
Dalton (2008, 92) notes, that in post-industrial societies citizens are increasingly be-
coming disengaged from the traditional channels of political participation. In western 
democracies it is visible in the decline of civic engagement, electoral turnout, the ero-
sion of public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy, and other 
signs of public weariness, skepticism, cynicism and lack of trust in politicians and polit-
ical parties. The idea about declining elections turnout and trust in public institutions is 
also expressed, for example, by Wattenberg (2002). 
However, according to Dalton, the trend is not just declining political participation. 
Reshaping of forms of political participation is happening. While citizens are becoming 
less involved into traditional participation activities, non-traditional forms of participa-
tion are increasing. Dalton connects this process with changing norms of citizenship in 
post-industrial societies.  
Transition from understanding citizenship merely as a duty towards understanding 
citizenship as engagement-based is what is happening in western societies. Self-
expression values underlie post-industrial societies and in terms of citizenship norms 
they lead to more direct and individualized forms of participation.  
Reduction in election turnout has been already recorded in the USA and most west-
ern democracies (see, for example Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002; Putnam 2000; Wat-
tenberg 2002). At the same time, the extension of engaged citizenship should stimulate 
people to participate in activities that give them more direct say and influence. Many 
engaged citizens will still vote because of the importance of elections to the democratic 
process, but also include more direct and individualized forms of action in their partici-
pation repertoire. When participation expands beyond usual elections, citizens become 
more flexible in choosing when they act, because they should not wait until the next 
elections round comes. As a result, the political influence of citizenry increases. (Dalton 
2008, 92-93.) 
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Thus, political participation in western countries tends to transform towards more 
versatile and direct forms of participation, due to changing values and norms of citizen-
ship in these societies. According to Dalton (2008), this process is rather positive, as the 
new style of citizenship seeks to place more control over political activity in the hands 
of the citizenry and can increase public pressure on political elites. Citizen participation 
is becoming more closely linked to citizen influence. As a result, it represents an oppor-
tunity to expand and enrich democratic participation. (Dalton 2008, 94.)  
One example of new forms of political participation is political consumption (of 
political consumerism). Political consumption includes purchasing choices, which are 
based on ethical and political considerations. This is a form through which people are 
able to express their social and political inclinations. Political consumerism may appear 
in the form of avoiding specific products, which go against the values of a person. On 
the other hand, political consumerism may be in the form of buying those products, 
which are in-line with values which a person supports (for example, ecologically 
produced or fair traded). Political consumption does not intend to influence the state 
directly, however, it may have political consequences. (Gil de Zúñiga, Copeland & 
Bimber 2013, 2-4.) One of the latest bright examples of political consumerism is “Bank 
Transfer Day”, initiated in 2011 (at the same time as the Occupy Wall Street) and was a 
protest against aggressive fees which banks announced for bank operations of their 
customers. (Pfeifer & Reckard 2011.) 
As the concept of civil society is relevant for the present study, as it has overlaps 
with the concept of political participation, it is also interesting to observe trends in the 
area of civil society. A study, conducted by the World Economic Forum, focuses on 
trends in development of civil society (civic associations, NGOs) in the western world. 
The following trends are highlighted in this research (World Economic Forum 2013, 6-
15): 
1. During the last two decades, the number of civil society organizations in the 
world increased significantly. However, the funding of civil society organiza-
tions has increased significantly only in specific areas. 
2. The use of on-line media changes communications within civil society. New 
forms of civic engagement co-exist with old ones. 
3. Civil society became more involved in consultation process with decision-
makers. 
4. Together with growth of civil society activities there is also growth of re-
strictions, for example, limiting access to national and foreign funding and 
creating barriers to on-line communications. 
5. Civil society roles are blurring as well as relationships with private sector and 
the state, as shown in Figure 2: 
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Figure 2 Changing paradigms for sector roles (World Economic Forum 2013, 10)  
6. Global institutions, that have been in place since the end of World War II, are 
no longer fit their purpose. Business, government and civil society leaders 
now want more socially inclusive models. 
7. The world is becoming hyper connected. Through increasing access to the In-
ternet, social media and mobile phones, the power of the individual as a vir-
tual citizen is on the rise. 
8. Interest is growing in the role of faith and religious culture in society. 
9. There is a profound public pressure – and increasingly an economic argument 
– for responding to pressing challenges of inequality. 
10. Significant demographic shift affects civil society.  
As it was regarded in the previous chapter, forms of political participation (including 
civic engagement) are multiple. This sub-chapter observed the general trends in this 
area in western societies, described by scholars. 
 
36 
4.2 Global spread of protest civic engagement 
Another trend which is observed globally by political scientists is the spread of protest 
politics
2
 during the last three decades: political protests increased both in terms of fre-
quency of events and in terms of the number of participants. The image of protest activi-
ty is also changing: from the “disturbing” activity to a normal part of politics (Rucht 
2007, 719-720).   
However, in 2000s the type of protest activity showed signs of change. Since 2009 
the wave of civic uprisings has gone through many countries in the world, both in de-
veloped western democracies (‘kitchenware’ revolution in Iceland (Castells 2012) in 
2009; Indignadas in Spain in 2011, Occupy Wall street in 2011, and other Occupy 
movements in different countries) and more authoritarian states (Arab Spring started in 
December 2010). The latest example is Ukraine, where after several months of mass 
protests in the end of 2013-beginning 2014 the president of the country resigned. In 
some countries movements were so strong that they have made a large political impact, 
such as change of power in Egypt, Ukraine and new constitution in Iceland. 
There have been done quite a lot of research on the latest social movements, men-
tioned above, for example: (1) the book of Castells (2012) summarizing observations 
from the major large-scale protests of the past years; (2) the paper of Nigam (2012) 
“The Arab upsurge and the “viral” revolutions of our times” analyzing social move-
ments of the beginning of 21
st
 century; (3) the paper “Horizontal Democracy Now: 
From Alterglobalization to Occupation” by Maeckelbergh (2012), analyzing the Spain 
movement and its significance for the development of new political practices.  
The common thing for all these movements was the leading role of information tech-
nology, which enhanced the ability of citizens to self-organize. Some scholars, for ex-
ample, Castells (2012) admit that these types of social movements are something new, 
which has not existed before. Overall, political scientists say that transformation of po-
litical behavior is happening both in developing and developed nations, the new forms 
of engagement and participation emerge and expand political participation beyond the 
boundaries of what it was conventionally viewed to be (see, for example Dalton & 
Klingemann 2007). 
                                                 
2
 Protest politics is the deliberation and public use of protest by groups or organizations (but rarely indi-
viduals) that seek to influence a political decision or process, which they perceive as having negative 
consequences for themselves, another group or society as a whole (Rucht 2007, 708).  
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4.3 History and trends of political participation in Russia 
According to Russian Center of Education in Election Technologies (2014), the 1980s-
1990s years in Russia were characterized by the upsurge of political participation of 
citizens. Some scholars (for example, Belyaeva 2007) argue that this period was the 
freest time for citizens in the whole Russian history. After that, the disengagement from 
politics increased and the right for decision-making was largely confined to the gov-
ernment officers. Studies recorded declining political participation since the middle of 
1990s and till the end of 2000s. Only recently, in 2011-2012, the situation began to 
change towards growing political participation and civic activity. 
This sub-chapter uses the classification of political participation forms, developed in 
the previous chapter. Following this classification, history and trends in manifest and 
latent political participation are described.  
4.3.1 Manifest political participation 
Formal political participation: 
1) Election turnout  
In Russian Federation elections are conducted at three levels: federal (president and 
parliament elections), regional and municipal elections. 
In the history of Russian Federation (during the past 23 years) there were 6 parlia-
ment and 6 president election rounds. Data on elections turnout (Table 4) does not show 
any stable trend in election activity of citizens
3
. Thus, voter turnout in parliament elec-
tions has being fluctuating during the past 20 years. However, on average the voter 
turnout in 1990s was 60%, the same as voter turnout in 2000s on average. The share of 
participants in president elections was maximal in the first president elections round and 
has been gradually declining till the year 2004. After that, the voter turnout has in-
creased. Thus, it cannot be said that elections turnout in Russia follows the same trend 
as the elections turnout in western democracies, where the decline of participation is 
observed. However, it should be also mentioned that some Russian political scientists 
question the reliability of the official elections turnout data (Lyubarev 2013). 
                                                 
3
 Table 4 shows aggregated data on election turnout for the whole country. At the same time, certain re-
gional differences exist. However, for the present study, regional differences are not taken into account, 
as the goal is to analyze political participation on the country level. 
38 
Table 4 Turnout on federal level elections in Russia, 1992-2012, percentage of 


























  1992-1993 1995-1996 1999-2000 2003-2004 2007-2008 2011-2012 
Parliament elections 54.81 64.76 61.85 55.75 63.71 60.2 
President elections 76.66 69.60 68.64 64.38 69.70 65.34 
As for regional and municipal elections, statistics on them is quite complicated, as 
there are 85 regions in Russian Federation and about 25 000 municipalities (Lyubarev 
2013). In general, researchers mention two observations about regional elections in 
Russia: firstly, regional elections turnout is usually lower than the federal elections 
turnout; secondly, voter turnout at regional parliament elections is lower than the voter 
turnout at regional governor’s elections. These observations are valid for the cases when 
regional and federal elections are held separately, not in the same day. The average re-
gional election turnout in 2003-2006 years in Russia was 41% (average for 44 elections, 
which were not combined with federal elections), with maximum at 69.6% in the Che-
chen republic and minimum at 27.9% in Sverdlovsk region. In 2007-2012 years the av-
erage voter turnout at regional parliament elections in Russia was 48% (the average for 
111 elections). (Lyubarev 2013.) 
What is the motivation for citizens to participate in elections? During the past 10 
years Russian research center “Levada Center” has being asking people about their mo-
tivations to participate in parliament elections (Table 5). 
Table 5 People’s principal motivation to participate in parliament elections, per-
centage of respondents (Levada Center 2012, 39) 
 Nov 2003 Oct 2007 Nov 2011 Dec 2011 
Civic duty 39 39 42 40 
Habit 14 11 11 12 
It is almost a single possibility to exhibit partici-
pation in the life of the country   
14 11 9 8 
Striving to express a political position (even 
though it does not help candidate or a party) 
12 14 14 13 
Striving to help favorite candidate to get to the 
parliament (increase its representation) 
10 8 9 13 
Striving to prevent unfavorable candidate from 
getting to the parliament or increase its represen-
tation 
4 3 5 7 
Voting at elections is common among my friends 4 8 8 6 
Other 1 1 <1 <1 
Difficult to answer 1 2 <1 <1 
39 
Levada Center researchers note that people usually cannot explain what kind of “civ-
ic duty” motivates them to participate in elections, and consider this category as close to 
the “habit” category. These two categories combined represent about half of voters.  
Data above also show that protest voting (category “striving to prevent unfavorable 
candidate from getting to the parliament or increase its representation”) has increased in 
the last elections, in December 2011.  
2) Volunteers at election observation 
Parliament elections in November 2011 were followed by a series of protests, as a 
reaction to the large amount of fraud in voting and calculation of elections’ results.  
People recognized the necessity of stronger civic monitoring over the elections process. 
Thus, by March 2012 (the time of presidential elections) people were able to self-
organize and create a network of activists who volunteered to be observers at the voting 
day of presidential elections. This was an unprecedented for Russia level of civic en-
gagement during elections. According to western media source, the group of elections 
volunteers “Citizen-observer” grew from 720 people in December 2011 to about 7000 
volunteers in the beginning of 2012. (The Associated Press 2012.) 
3) Membership in parties 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation moved from one ruling 
party to a multi-party system. However, since the beginning of 2000s party creation 
conditions have been toughened and, as a result, in the period from 2001 till 2012 only 
8 political parties were registered and could participate in elections (Central Election 
Commission of the Russian Federation n/a). During this period in fact a single party 
dominance emerged: the party “United Russia” got majority in a parliament and sup-
ported initiatives by the president and the government. After citizens’ protests in the end 
of 2011-the beginning of 2012, parties legislation has been liberalized and within the 
next two years more than 60 new parties with the right to participate in elections were 
registered.  
However, overall, only a small share of citizens is involved in parties’ activities. 
Russian Public Opinion Research Center
4
 has been measuring shares of people’s partic-
ipation in parties’ activities in 2004-2013 years. According to its data (Russian Public 
Opinion Research Center 2013), during this period, participation in political parties was 
fluctuating from 0% (minimum level in 2011) to 2%. A different study, conducted by 
                                                 
4
 <http://www.wciom.com/>  
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Levada Center in August 2013 showed that 3% of respondents participated in a party or 
actively supported its activity. (Levada Center 2013a.) 
4) Support of political candidates  
Developments of social networks and possibilities for on-line money transfers have 
affected the ways in which citizens can support their favorite party or political candi-
date, for example, through crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is a cooperation of people, 
who collectively donate money to support a certain project of other people or organiza-
tions. These projects can be business projects as well as political projects. Such type of 
support can be regarded as emerging phenomenon in social and political life in Russia.  
During the past several years, there were several crowd funding examples observed 
in Russian public arena. In the beginning, people started to collect money though social 
networks for humanitarian purposes, such as serious diseases treatment (for example, 
cancer). Around the year 2012, when opposition movement was rising, people started to 
donate money for political actions. Popular Russian blogger – Alexey Navalny, man-
aged to raise millions of rubles for the activity of his NGO fighting against corruption in 
Russia. Probably, unless there are no legislation restrictions, this type of support will be 
more common in the future. 
5) Contacting politicians and their representatives  
Social networks influenced on how politicians communicate with citizens. More and 
more politicians use social networks and blogs to write about their attitudes to actual 
issues and to get people’s feedback. However, the statistics on how many citizens con-
tact politicians or political representatives directly is not yet available.    
Extra-parliamentary participation: 
No studies on the popularity of political consumption or civil disobedience in Russia 
were found, despite the fact that these types of involvement can be observed in socio-
political life of the country. Assumingly, these forms of participation are quite rarely 
used by citizens, or they have not been perceived by researchers as powerful instru-
ments of citizens’ influence. 
1) Signing petitions 
In 2012, at St. Petersburg Economic Forum President Vladimir Putin promised that 
any legislation initiative which gathers 100 000 votes on-line, from authorized Internet 
users, will be discussed in the Russian Parliament.  
According to data of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, about 4% of citi-
zens signed petitions (related to issues of a country, region, town/city) in the year 2004. 
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In 2006 and 2011 this parameter declined: to 2% in 2006 and 1% in 2011. In 2012, the 
share of Russian citizens who signed a petition had slightly increased – up to 2%. 
(Russian Center of Education in Election Technologies 2014)  
Signing petitions is not yet a powerful instrument to influence decision-making in the 
country however some “small victories” happened. For example, in 2012 more than 
3000 people signed a petition on the web-site <www.change.org> and demanding to 
dismiss charges to bloggers and journalists whom Gazprombank accused of libel, when 
they talked about the incident of the vice-president of the bank shooting down a child. 
At the end Gazprombank dropped its charges.        
2) Social movements, participation in demonstrations and protests 
In Russia, participation in social movements and participation in protests or demon-
strations are often connected with each other. According to Kleman (2007), who has 
been studying new social movements in Russia since the year 2004, civil society in 
Russia in the beginning of 2000s was emerging through the new grassroots social 
movements, which were mainly protest movements. Qualitative studies documented the 
appearance of new active groups of citizens, which tried to self-organize. However, the 
number of citizens involved in these groups was too little to be registered by statistical 
studies.     
One of the large social movements happened in 2004-2006 and was against the ini-
tiative of the government to monetize social benefits. According to estimations, about 
500 000 people were involved in all activities of the movement. Another large move-
ment started since 2005 and was devoted to problems of housing. Kleman also notes the 
emergence of labor conflicts on different factories and protests of workers. (Kleman 
2007, 26-28) 
In 2011-2012 an opposition movement was on the rise in Russia. Protests, which 
started in Moscow and other cities after the parliament elections in 2011, demanded for 
fair elections. These protests also indicated  that the  large  amount of people does not 
support current state policies and the president Putin come back, who are unsatisfied by 
the level of corruption and closed political system, demand for political reforms and 
reforms of social institutions (for example, the first requirement expressed by protesters  
was to reform judiciary system). At the same time a large amount of population sup-
ported Putin’s presidential come back and believe that only Putin is capable of ruling 
the country and there is no alternative to him (Shaihutdinov 2012).  
After several months of occasional demonstrations, the occupation of a public place 
happened in Moscow. In May 2012, after the demonstration at Bolotnaya square, where 
police was very brutal in dispelling the crowd, the group of active oppositionists contin-
ued a peaceful demonstration: during the whole evening and night they walked along 
streets of Moscow and finally set up at Chistye Prudy. Since that day the opposition 
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camp was set up there and the camp lasted for about two weeks. This camp followed a 
model of Occupy Wall Street in the New York City, but the organization of camp life 
was not pre-defined from the beginning. The process of camp life organization, defining 
activities and rules within the camp was the process of self-organization. 
After a year of protests on Moscow squares, the opposition movement turned into a 
more organized phase. Using their own resources through self-organization opposition-
ists organized national elections to the Opposition Coordination Council – a group of 
people elected in order to “be the voice” of the opposition movement, represent people 
involved in the opposition movement. Elections resulted in a success. (Russia Today 
2012, October 21.)  
The statistics on dynamics of citizens’ participation in protest activity in 2004-2012 
does not show a well-pronounced trend. In 2004 the share of citizens, who participated 
in demonstrations related to events in the country, region or town/city, was 5%, in 2006 
– 4%, in 2011 – 1% and in 2012 – 3%. (Russian Center of Education in Election Tech-
nologies 2014.)  
Though only a small proportion of citizens are involved in protest activity, in general 
social movements are very important for the development of civil society. As Kleman 
writes, not only protests and demonstrations are organized within social movements, but 
there are also constructive forms of self-organization. Such social initiatives become 
means for the change of political culture, the emergence of new norms, values and the 
development of social solidarity. (Kleman 2008, 28) 
Rostislav Turovsky, expert of the Center of Political Technologies, claims that pro-
test climate in Russia is cyclic: there are periods of rise, which are followed by periods 
of decline. (Garmonenko & Gorbachev, 2014.) Thus, the period of 2011-2012 years was 
characterized by social uprisings, while, according to the latest data, the desire to protest 
in quite low. However, problems, against which people were protesting in 2011-2012 
are not solved yet, therefore, during the calm, no-protest period, discontent of citizens is 
accumulating and might lead to protests in the nearest future. (Garmonenko & 
Gorbachev 2014.) 
4.3.2 Latent political participation 
1) Interest in politics 
The data presented in the Table 6 shows the growth of interest to politics in Russia in 
the period from 2007-2012. However, there is still a large share of people who are not 
interested in politics.     
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Table 6 Dynamics of people’s interest to politics, percentage of responses (Rus-
sian Center of Education in Technologies 2014)  
“Are you interested in politics?” 2007 2012 
Definitely interested, largely interested 42 51 
Somewhat interested, not interested at all 54 42 
Difficult to answer 3 7 
2) Identifying with a certain ideology or party 
According to the data, collected by Levada Center in December 2014, during the 
year 2014, on average, 58% of Russian citizens were ready to vote for a certain party 
(Levada Center 2014). Though the level of support is fluctuating, for the year 2014 it 
can be considered at the level of 58%. 
According to the report issued by Sociology Institute of Russian Academy of Science 
(2012), about 95% of citizens (aged 18-55 years old) support some political ideology. 
The following groups were defined, according to their ideological preferences: liberals 
and social-democrats – 28%; supporters of the strong state and market economy – 10%; 
supporters of the strong state and socialist economy – 57% (Sociology Institute of Rus-
sian Academy of Science 2012, 42-43). 
3) Short-term self-organization for solving social issues 
Due to the spread of information technologies, people are becoming more able to 
self-organize, to act and produce social change. One example was the activity of volun-
teers helping citizens who suffered after a flood in Krymsk town. After the severe flood, 
which happened in Krymsk in July 2012, around 2000 of volunteers all over the country 
came to the ruined town in order to help those who survived. The volunteers were driv-
en only by their self-motivation and communicated with each other a lot via the Inter-
net. This fact had an enormous effect on the society. For example, Crowfoot (2013) 
writes how a Russian social activist describes the consequences of the event. 
According to population surveys, conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center, relatively large share of people are involved in self-organization for solving 
some social issues (Table 7): in 2012 15% of citizens participate in either collection of 
resources or in collective actions for the improvement of common living areas. 
Table 7 Dynamics of various self-organization forms for solving social issues 
(Russian Center of Education in Election Technologies 2014) 
 
2004 2006 2011 2012 
% of citizens participated in collective improvement of houses, play-
grounds for children, common living territories  
15 9 8 10 
% of citizens participated in collection of money or necessary things 
for people in need (due to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, health 
problems, surgery etc.) 
9 4 4 5 
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However, in reality self-organization can be more widespread, due to some forms, 
which were not covered by the survey.  
4) Participation in non-governmental organizations (NGOs): 
a. Membership in NGOs; 
b. Volunteering in social work for an NGO or other organization; 
c. Giving money to charity or NGOs. 
Among all forms of political participation, functioning of NGOs, participation in 
NGOs is one of the best-studied in Russia. 
As Djibladze (2007) noted, in the 90s NGOs were almost ignored by the state. By the 
end of the 90s, NGOs began to understand that it is not enough to struggle with the con-
sequences of flawed policies, violation of human rights, corruption or crimes committed 
by government representatives. NGOs realized the importance to work not with selected 
matters and to fix only elected drawbacks, but instead to influence political decision-
making, to learn to be experts, to communicate with the state officials and perform civic 
control over governmental decisions. By the beginning of 2000s NGOs progressed in 
realization of these functions.  
However, later on the state decided to build civil society from the top, perceiving 
civic associations not as independent actors of the political process, but as means to 
achieve certain goals of the government. Under such policy, imitations of civil society 
organizations were created, such as Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation
5
. Usually, 
state expects from NGOs to support state’s policy in public or perform social work 
which government itself does not want to do or cannot do for some reasons. In the best 
case the state uses the expertise of civic associations, but nevertheless NGOs do not 
have any right to vote and all decisions are finally made by government officials. The 
organizations which do not want to follow this model become an opposition. Often such 
organizations even become enemies of the state and can be oppressed in various ways. 
(Djibladze 2007, 90-91.) This is the state of affairs which exists in the Russian society 
in the past decade. 
The trend of the NGOs controlled by the state was noted by a number of Russian re-
searchers (see, for example, Gudkov 2007; Patrushev 2007; Daniel 2007; Makarychev 
2007. 
According to data presented by Russian Social Chamber in 2007, about 360 000 non-
governmental organizations were registered in the country. However, as Gudkov (2007) 
claims, only a small part of them can be regarded as really grassroots associations inde-
pendent from the state. In the 90s these NGOs were operating more or less freely, how-
                                                 
5
 <https://www.oprf.ru/en>  
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ever, in the 2000s there is more and more pressure over independent organizations, due 
to the government fears of “orange revolution”. The pressure is performed through 
toughening legislation, tax pressure, frequent checks, provoking conflicts inside organi-
zations, discrediting in the media etc. At the same time, government creates imitations 
of civil society associations, such as Social Chamber, which serve interests of the gov-
ernment. As a result, citizens still cannot influence political decision-making, which 
also leads to the atomization of society. (Gudkov 2007, 15-16.) 
Similarly to Gudkov, Daniel noted that the state in 2000s started to perceive any in-
dependent political or civic participation as threatening the state. This attitude strength-
ened especially after “orange revolutions” in ex-Soviet countries (Georgia in 2004 and 
Ukraine in 2004-2005), where NGOs played an important role. As a result, fears of such 
revolutions appeared in the Russian government. (Gudkov 2007, 80.) 
Makarychev (2007) argues that two models of civic association co-exist in Russia. 
The first one is based on governmental control and regards associational life and NGOs 
as directly or indirectly controlled by the state. This model has an implicit idea that so-
cial relations are based on political interests therefore civic organizations should be cre-
ated from the top. The second model is related to globalization, internationalization 
which leads to creation of global NGOs branches in Russia. It implies that civil society 
is not only an internal phenomenon, but should be global in the end. According to 
Makarychev (2007), the period from the beginning of 1990s in Russia was characterized 
by the changing relationship of these two models. However, the more interesting ques-
tion is that will these two models give room for the development of the third model of 
associational life – associations which are not branches of international NGOs, but at 
the same time, are independent from the state. (Makarychev 2007, 46.)  
Statistics of participation of citizens in various NGOs is presented in the Table 8. 
Table 8 Dynamics of participation in different types of non-governmental organi-
zations (Russian Center of Education in Election Technologies 2014)  
 2004 2006 2011 2012 
% of citizens participated in the activity of social organizations (de-
fending human rights, charity, ecologic etc)  
2 1 1 2 
% of citizens participated in trade unions 4 1 1 2 
Researchers and activists of NGOs outline a number of problems and challenges in 
the development of civil society: 
1. The attempt of the state to control non-governmental organizations financial-
ly. State motivates NGOs to reduce financing from abroad and become ready 
to give money from state funds and also to involve activists into state coun-
cils. In this situation NGOs are challenges to understand clearly if they are 
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ready to cooperate with the state or they will follow their mission, which can 
be different from what the state wants (Syslov 2007, 54-55).  
2. Attempts of the state to make NGOs politically neutral. On the one hand, the 
state seeks for civil society support, on the other hand – tries to sterilize it po-
litically. Under current conditions, only strong politically neutral NGOs can 
survive. (Kuklina 2007, 59-60.) 
3. Gudkov (2007) and Patrushev (2007) note a lack of solidarity and trust 
among citizens, which leads to social disintegration. 
4. The lack of trust in political and social institutions also presents a problem 
for associational life (Patrushev 2007). 
5. As it was noted by Gudkov (2007), Dubin (2007), Patrushev (2007), people 
still do not feel themselves as independent from the state. In other words, 
Russian person feels as a “state person”. 
6. Dubin (2007) also noted that people do not feel responsibility for the society 
they live in. Society is perceived as “others, not me”. 
Kleman (2007) emphasized the gap between officially established non-governmental 
organizations and informal social movements. While NGOs mainly use the model of 
social services for clients, social movements use protests and activism as their main 
tools for achieving goals. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The review of the recent history and existing trends of political participation in Russia 
presented statistical data about the involvement of Russian citizens into various forms 
of political participation. Relying on this statistical data, the rough scenery of political 
participation in Russia can be outlined. Table 9 combines all data regarded in this chap-




Table 9 Involvement of citizens in various forms of political participation 








Voting at elections and referenda No well-pronounced trends in the past two decades were identified. In the last federal elections round, 
election turnout was about 60% at Parliament elections and about 65% at President elections. Participation 
in elections is mainly driven by the feeling of “civic duty”. 
Contacting politicians  No data on the number of involved people. However, new forms of communication are emerging. 
Donating money for parties or candidates No data on the number of involved people. However, the form of support – crowd funding has emerged. It 
is uncertain, whether it will be developing in the future. 
Being a party member In the 2013 the share of people involved in a party or party activity was estimated at the level of 2-3%. 
Voluntary work for a party No data on the number of involved people. A growth of interest towards being a voluntary observer at 






















Political consumption No data on the number of involved people. 
Signing petitions About 2% of people signed petitions in 2012. 
Involvement in new social movements Several large social movements happened in 2004-2014 years. According to Kleman (2007), the number 
of people involved in movements is small and cannot appear in statistical data. 
Participation in peaceful demonstrations, 
protests, strikes and other actions 
The share of people participated in protests in 2012 was estimated to be 3%. It was a year of large social 
uprisings. Overall, as experts say, protest activity in Russia has a cyclic form. 
Civil disobedience  No data on the number of involved people. 











 Perceiving politics as important and fol-
lowing political news 
The growth of interest was observed in studies: from 42% in 2007 till 51% of people interested in politics 
in 2012.  
Identifying with a certain ideology or 
party 
On average, 58% citizens expressed support to a certain political party in 2014. According to data of 2012, 






Giving money to charity or NGOs No data on the number of involved people. 
Active interest in politics According to surveys, about 51% of citizens in 2012 were interested in politics, however, it was not men-
tioned, was this interest active or passive.  
Short-term self-organization for solving 
social issues 
In 2012, 10% of people were involved in some collective work for improvement of the living environment 
and 5% of people were involved into collection of money or things to people in need. 
Membership in an NGO In 2012, about 2% of people were involved in the work for NGOs, 2% - in the activity of trade unions. 
During the period 2004-2014 the share of people, involved in NGOs or trade unions somewhat declined 
(especially, in was low in the years 2006 and 2011). 
Volunteering in social work for an NGO 




Non-voting, perceiving politics as non-
interesting 
The share of people, who are not interested in politics declined from 54% in 2007 to 42% in 2012. How-




As was shown, in western democracies there is a trend of declining traditional forms 
of political participation (such as participation in elections and parties) and growing 
interest towards non-traditional, more individualized and flexible forms. Russian reality 
seems to differ. There are no signs of declining traditional forms of political participa-
tion in Russia: election turnout and participation in political parties do not follow a con-
crete trend. The number of parties even grew in 2012-2014 years, due to liberalization 
of party legislation. Moreover, interest to politics among Russian citizens increased by 
2012 compared to 2007.  
This chapter has outlined a global trend of growing protest participation, which is 
relevant also for Russia. In the past 10 years, there were relatively large movements 
against government’s policy, for better living conditions, for fair elections. Some re-
searchers claim that protest movements follow a cyclic pattern in Russia.  
In terms of non-traditional forms of political participation, there are no visible trends 
in Russia. Among these forms, the largest share of people is involved in short-term col-
lective self-organization for helping people in need. Also, some new tools for participa-
tion are emerging (crowd funding, on-line petitioning, new ways to communicate with 
political representatives), but they are not widely popular at the moment. There are no 
signs that political consumption is popular in Russia (not much discussions or new in 
the media and in academic literature).  
Trends for NGOs in Russia have some common points with trends in western coun-
tries however there are significant differences as well. Firstly, civil society actors be-
came more involved in consultation process with decision-makers. Similarly, in Russia 
the government involves NGOs representatives as experts for certain issues. World 
Economic Forum (2013) also mentioned the growth of restrictions, for example, limit-
ing access to national and foreign funding and creating barriers to on-line communica-
tions. Similar process goes in Russia, especially related to cutting foreign funding. 
As mentioned in the text above, in western democracies civil society roles are blur-
ring as well as relationships with private sector and the state. From this perspective, the 
trend is different in Russia. Here the state tries to control NGOs as much as possible, 
attempting to reach certain goals of the government by hands of civil society associa-
tions. Associations, which want to act independently from the state, become an opposi-
tion and feel more pressure.    
Overall, researchers admit that there are two models of civic associations which oc-
cupy the most of the public space: either associations controlled by the state or associa-
tions included in the international civil society (mostly, branches of global NGOs). To-
gether with these two models there is smaller number of grassroots associations, which 
emerged within the country and which are not controlled by the state. It is an uncertain-
ty, how this sector of civil society will be able to evolve in the future.  
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5 DRIVING FORCES FOR THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL PAR-
TICIPATION 
The analysis of forces, influencing the system under investigation, is an important step 
in scenarios building. In the present study the experts’ opinions, gathered through a 
Delphi study, have a critical importance for identification of driving forces of political 
participation in Russia. However, in order to create a Delphi questionnaire the initial 
screening and selections of driving forces will be done. This chapter presents the list of 
hypothetical driving forces of political participation, based on literature review. Later 
on, this list will be tested in a Delphi study, where it will be evaluated collectively by 
experts, and as a result of this process the final list of the most important drivers will be 
created and used in scenarios-building. 
5.1 The method of driving forces identification 
The selection of driving forces, which are to be tested in the Delphi study, was conduct-
ed in two steps.  
On the first step it was observed what other futures studies researchers have already 
done on the topic. For this purpose, the review of foresight studies on a similar subject 
were conducted (such topics as scenarios/futures of political participation, civil society, 
civic activism etc. were taken into account). Two such studies were found: the study 
about the future role of civil society, conducted by World Economic Forum (2013), and 
scenarios for civil society, created by Carnegie UK Trust (2007b). Both studies focus on 
the situation in Western countries, therefore, only the most relevant drivers for Russian 
situation could be used for the purposes of the present study. Thus, the driving forces, 
indentified in these studies were analyzed and the most relevant ones were included into 
the list of drivers in a Delphi questionnaire.  
On the second step, brainstorming was condected by the researcher and several extra 
drivers were added into the list. This chapte provides explanation of each driver in the 
list of drivers and argumentation of how this driver could influence the political 
participation in the future. 
Driving forces in the study by Carnegie UK Trust 
In the research about civil society scenarios in the UK and Ireland, Carnegie UK 
Trust highlights social, political, technological, economic, environmental and organiza-
tional drivers which are most likely to influence the development of civil society in the 
future (Carnegie UK Trust 2007a, 17-19). Trend-impact analysis is used to structure 
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drivers and creates a canvas of drivers classified into categories of contexts, uncertain-
ties and outcomes (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Schematic of prioritized drivers (Carnegie UK Trust 2007a, 23)  
The relevance of each of these drivers to the context of Russia was analyzed. In this 
way, some drivers were selected as relevant for the present study and other drivers were 
evaluated as non-relevant for the Russian situation (based on the analysis of statistical 
data and scientific publications). The following drivers were evaluated as relevant for 
Russia. 
 Falling cost of technologies (technological driver) 
 Increasing migration (social driver) 
 Growing socio-economic inequalities (economic driver) 
 Rising individualism (social driver) 
 Cultural and religious diversity (social driver) 
 The rise of ‘digital natives’ (technological driver) 
 Pervasive technology (technological driver) 
 Visibility of the security state (political driver) 
 Regulation of civic life (political driver) 
 From media consumption to media production (technological driver)  
 Growth of surveillance state (political driver) 
For the purposes of a questionnaire-building, some of the drivers in the list above can 
be grouped together. This could make the list of drivers shorter in the questionnaire, 
which could ultimately lead to higher motivation of respondents to give broader expla-
nations of their opinions. The principle of making the questionnaire as short as possible 
was used in Delphi study preparation. 
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In our opinion, the most important technology, influencing political participation of 
citizens is information and communication technologies (ICT), other technologies do 
not influence so strongly on political participation. Particularly, ICT lead to changing 
citizens “from media consumption to media production”. Thus, we argue that the three 
technological drivers, included in the list above (falling technology costs, pervasive 
technology, from media consumption to media production) can be grouped into a single 
driver “the spread of information and communication technologies”. 
The drivers “visibility of the security state”, “growth of surveillance state” and 
“regulation of civic life” are similar drivers in the Russian context. In the recent past, 
the claims for higher security state have lead to stronger regulation of civic life in the 
country. Therefore, these three drivers will be grouped into one – “regulation of civic 
life” in the Delphi questionnaire. 
 In addition, the driver “the rise of digital natives” from the point of view of this pro-
ject will be regarded as a social driver (not technological driver). The rise of digital na-
tives is conditioned by technological factors, but ultimately it leads to social changes. 
And finally, in our opinion it would be more relevant for the Russian context to 
transform the driver “cultural and religious diversity” into the driver “multi-nationality”. 
In this case, the information about cultural and religious diversity is not lost, but at the 
same time the nationality factor is added. Russia is a multi-national country therefore 
the nationality factor is important.  
Driving forces in the study by World Economic Forum 
The report “The Future Roles of Civil Society” by the World Economic Forum identi-
fies the following critical driving forces which could, in the future, reshape the context 
in which civil society is operating to 2030 (World Economic Forum 2013, 19-21). The-
se drivers are formulated in a different way, though in essence are similar to those iden-
tified by Carnegie UK Trust, thus no additional factors will be added to a Delphi ques-
tionnaire from this list: 
1. The level and source of funding for civil society stakeholders. 
2. The social and political influence of increasing access to technology. 
3. The extent and the type of citizen engagement with societal challenges. 
4. The state of global and regional geopolitical stability and global integration of 
markets. 
5. The effect of environmental degradation and climate change on populations. 
6. The level of trust in governments, businesses and international organizations. 
 
Extra driving forces 
Some of the extra driving forces can be added after the analysis of drivers used in the 
Carnegie UK Trust study. These drivers were mentioned in the text above, namely: 
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 Generations change; 
 Corruption. 
In addition to all factors mentioned in this sub-chapter, it would be interesting to 
propose for deeper expert analysis the factor of crowd funding. This factor is largerly 
the concequence of ICT spread, however, it presents the effects on political participation 
which go beyond communication or information distrubution in the society. It is 
important to analyse these effects to understand the future of political participation 
better. 
And finally, the factor of economic crisis, the importance of which is increasing in 
the modern Russia, cannot be omitted in the present study.  
5.2 Description of driving forces 
This sub-chapter sums up all driving forces, identified in the previous sub-chapter. Fac-
tors are grouped into several categories: technological, social, political and economic 
drivers. The essence of each of these drivers and its potential effect on political partici-
pation is regarded in detail below. 
5.2.1 Technological drivers 
 The spread of information and communication technologies (ICT)  
Information and communication technologies, including Internet, social networks 
and devices for communication, such as smart phones, have been increasingly popular 
in Russia since the beginning of 2000s. 
According to recent studies, the number of Russian citizens who use Internet at least 
once a month or more often has increased from 6% in 2001 to 65% in 2013. The majori-
ty of these people use Internet daily (the number of people who use Internet on a daily 
basis during the past 12 years increased from 2% to 59%). Especially, the Internet pene-
tration is high among young people. 91% of Russians younger than 25 years old use the 
Internet and 23% of Russians older 55 years old use the Internet. Moreover, more peo-
ple are following Russian and international news through the Internet than before. 
(Levada Center 2013c.) As the study of Gfk Rus (2010) describes it, “in Russia over the 
recent years the Internet from a technology of the future became an integral part of our 
lives, which is hard to imagine without chat, e-mail, information search, as well as 
shopping and services banking.”  
According to the study “The Mobile Consumer” conducted by Nielsen, 98% of peo-
ple (16 years old and older) in Russia use a mobile phone, among which 37% of users 
53 
have a smart phone. Among smart phone users 68% do web browsing, 59% do social 
networking, 55% check their e-mails, 39% watch mobile TV or video. (Nielsen 2013.) 
Social media, such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube etc. are especially 
popular among young people. Social media, like blogs, give an opportunity to create on-
line groups and communities, including politically oriented groups. By signing up to a 
certain group a member is showing his or her interest in a certain idea. 
Due to state control over major media in Russia, independent media, including media 
produced by citizens themselves play a large role in civic and political life of the coun-
try. In other words, blogs and different social media web-services serve and an alterna-
tive media. 
Written blogs in such services as LiveJournal, WordPress etc. are increasingly popu-
lar in Russia. What is interesting many of these blogs are politically related, so political 
discussions are very lively in the blogosphere. In addition to private blogs, on-line polit-
ical communities are created (Krestinina & Chernyshev 2008).  
Krestinina and Charnyshev claim that blogs are used not only by ordinary people, but 
also by politicians and political parties (both official and oppositional), and identify the 
following trends in the use of blogs in political activity: 
 Usage of blogs for information, consolidation of supporters and coordination of 
their actions;  
 Promotion and discussion of ideas (politicians admit, that blogs give them an 
opportunity to get fresh ideas and discuss things that they cannot discuss in other 
places), also some ideas are tested before being published in official media; 
 Counter-propaganda, the fight against political opponents. 
In general, the use of blogs and social networks lead to fast spread of information 
and makes coordination of collective actions easier. 
ICT revolution brings important changes into communication in the society. Castells 
analyses affects of ICT in relation to social movements in his book Networks of outrage 
and hope: social movements in the Internet age. As Castells claims, mass communica-
tion though Internet ultimately leads to transformation of power relations in the society, 
which depend to a large extent on communication networks (Castells 2012, 4-13).  
Firstly, Internet serves as a communication channel which is more or less independ-
ent from the state control and able to connect many people together. Being connected 
people get necessary emotional support, which enhances their ability for collective ac-
tions. As Castells puts it, Internet brings people together, helps to overcome fear and 
hope for better humanity (Castells 2012, 14-15).  
Secondly, mass Internet use provides the technological platform for the construction 
of autonomy of the social actor (individual or collective) from the institutions and thus 
creates the “culture of autonomy” (the term used by Castells).  
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According to Castells, there is a cultural transformation happening in many modern 
societies and the transformation is characterized by the rising values of individuation 
and autonomy (Castells 2012, 230-231). Individuation emphasizes individual projects of 
a person as a major principle orientating his/her behavior. These projects are not neces-
sarily focused on an individual life of a person, but also may target at achieving some 
collective benefits. Autonomy means the capacity of a social actor to act around projects 
constructed independently of the institutions existing in a society, according to his/her 
own interests and values.  
Castells argues that Internet plays an important role in supporting values of individ-
uation and autonomy, and creates a culture of freedom (Castells 2012, 231-234). From 
its origin in 1970s the Internet technology was developed as a decentralized network, 
independent from a single command centre. The deepest social effect of the Internet 
emerged with the development of social networks which were controlled by their users. 
Social networks nowadays are used for any kind of activities, including socio-political 
activism.  
Thus, the spread of information and communication technologies, including Inter-
net, social networks and smart phones is a relevant trend for Russia and a driver for the 
future civic activism. As it was argued, widespread ICT brings two important effects. 
Firstly, it enables communication of many people, giving them a sense of togetherness 
and enhances collective actions. And secondly, Internet supports a culture of freedom, 
individuation and autonomy, so people tend to develop more projects according to their 
individual visions and values, with limited control from a state. The study conducted by 
Trajectory Partnership in 2010 analyses how Internet use influences on people’s well-
being. The study reveals that the use of Internet empowers people by giving them the 
sense of freedom and control (Trajectory Partnership 2010, 7-8). 
The study “Unraveling the effect of active and passive forms of political Internet use: 
Does it affect citizens’ political involvement?” Kruikemeier et al. (2013) claim to prove 
findings of other scholars regarding that only a few citizens use Internet for political 
participation
6
. According to the study, also some forms of Internet political participation 
are more popular than other forms. Moreover, those people who use Internet for politi-
cal purposes are those who are already engaged in politics in other forms. However, 
scholars emphasize that Internet forms of political participation are still in the develop-
ment phase; therefore, new technological achievements and forms of political commu-
nication and participation may appear in the future and lead to stronger political in-
volvement. (Kruikemeier et al. 2013, 12) 
                                                 
6
 The study was carried out in Netherlands. 
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 Emerging possibilities for crowdfunding 
In addition to various influences, the development of information and communica-
tion technologies created possibilities for crowdfunding, which is largely used both in 
business and politics or other projects. For example, Barak Obama used crowd funding 
in his election campaign in the USA. 
Crowdfunding is method of financing, when money is donated by many people, 
sometimes millions of people. Donors support the project or candidate they like and 
sometimes donate only a small amount of money, but the combined amount of money 
can be millions of dollars. Donation is usually done through Internet. 
Though in western world crowdfunding platforms are well developed, this type of 
collective donations is quite new for Russia, however, it is an emerging trend. The pre-
vious chapter touched upon some examples of crowdfunding in Russia in the past years. 
In the future, with the development of necessary Internet platforms may popularize this 
method of funding for political and social actors in Russia. However an uncertainty re-
mains: whether crowdfunding method will gain trust among Russians, will they be ea-
ger to donate money. Probably, it will depend on the level of trust in a society in gen-
eral, as well as honesty of those people, who will get donations through crowdfunding.    
5.2.2 Social drivers 
 Generation change 
Currently, the most active people on Russian social and political arena are coming 
from the age group 35-60 years. However, gradually, people, who are now in their 
twenties and younger, will be more and more active in a public sphere. These young 
people are different from older generations by two important parameters. 
Firstly, they were born at the end of 1980s or the beginning or 1990s, grew up and 
socialized in a new Russian state. They do not have experience of living in the Soviet 
Union, which had a high level of state paternalism. Therefore, these people can have 
less expectations of state control and be more active in influencing political decision- 
making than older generations. Potentially, these people can bring in new practices in 
social and political life. However, the exact form of their activities and effect they will 
bring is not pre-determined; therefore it creates uncertainty for the future of civic activ-
ism. 
The second factor which generation change is bringing is the emergence of “digital 
natives”. The term “digital native” was introduced by Marc Prensky in 2001 (however, 
there are several others terms in use describing the same phenomena, such as “net gen-
eration”, “millenials” etc). By this concept Prensky meant young people, who were born 
in Internet era and grew up surrounded by digital technologies and communication de-
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vices. Therefore, these people are “native speakers” of the language of computers, In-
ternet and video games.   
 
Figure 4 Trends in Internet usage and the spread of mobile cellular subscriptions 
in Russia, 1991-2013 (World Bank, n/a) 
In Russia, the Internet usage and mobile phones penetration has been growing since 
the beginning of 2000s (see Figure 4). Therefore, a part of young people were born and 
grew up already in the Internet era. Young people, now aged 25-27 years, have most 
likely started to use Internet actively since their university years; therefore an important 
period in their socialization is connected with the Internet. Overall, young people use 
Internet very actively: as it was mentioned above, 91% of Russians younger than 25 
years old use the Internet compared to 23% of Russians older 55 years old who use the 
Internet. (Levada Center 2013c.) Moreover, the age of Internet users is decreasing. Al-




Though, debates about the “digital natives” concept definitions are continuing among 
scholars, there has been an attempt to measure the size of “digital natives” population 
across countries in the world in 2012. The report “Measuring the Information Society 
2013” presents the calculation of digital natives’ population size (International 
Telecommunication Union 2013, 127-158). The concept of digital natives is operation-
alized in the report in the following way: “a youth aged 15-24 inclusive, with five years 
or more experience using the Internet”. Using this model, the report estimated the 6.1-
9% share of digital natives in total population in Russia in 2012. This share is projected 
to increase in the future.  
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However, there is still research and debates going on about the special characteristics 
which digital natives possess compared to previous generations. The effect of growing 
“digital natives” on civic activism is not pre-determined. As these people will enter ac-
tive roles in social life for the first time in history, it is uncertain how they will act. One 
hypothesis can be that, as they grew up in the Internet era, they can bring more culture 
of autonomy from social institutions and enhance civic activism according to their val-
ues and personal projects.  
 Spreading values of individualism 
The study “Values in modern Russia” (Fund after Pitirim Sorokin 2007) concludes 
that individualism since the breakup of the Soviet Union became the one of the domi-
nant values in the modern Russian society. Especially the value of individualism is in-
herent to young people.  
The study by Carnegie UK Trust states several potential consequences of rising indi-
vidualism in a society, namely: social atomization, declining trust in institutions, frag-
menting values, declining sense of community. Rising individualism may present a 
challenge for solidarity in a society, which is important for collective actions. However, 
rising individualism can also lead to the spread of engagement citizenship norms and, as 
a result, to less traditional and more direct forms of action (following a path which 
western countries are going through, as described in previous chapters). 
 Migration (into and out of the country) 
Migration is a relevant and important topic for Russia. It is stated by the government 
and economic analytics that Russian economy will not survive in the future without the 
inflow of migrants’ working force. Particularly, by 2025 the workforce in the country is 
projected to decrease by 18-19 millions of people (due to low birth rate and high death 
rate) which cannot be compensated by internal human resources (Turukanova 2008). 
As the Figure 5 shows, migration to Russia from foreign countries has been increas-
ing during the past decade. Migration from Russia has been declining in 1997-2011, 
however, somewhat increased in 2012-2013 years. 
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Figure 5 Migration into and out of Russia, number of people (Federal State 
Statistic Service, n/a) 
However, many of migrants are working in Russia illegally and problems related to 
this increase tensions in the society (Levada Center 2013b).  
According to the study by Carnegie UK trust, inflow of migrants creates questions on 
how to manage cultural and religious diversity. The inflow of migrants could have a 
positive impact on civil society, because it creates new needs which can lead to the de-
velopment of new associations or the adaptation of existing associations. New associa-
tions could bring in new energies and new types of associational life. (Carnegie UK 
Trust 2007b) 
 Multi-nationality 
National diversity can be a consequence of migration, but in case of Russia it is also 
historically formed. The country has always been multi-national country (nowadays 
Russia includes up to 100 different nationalities) with high religious diversity. Russian 
Federation includes 21 national republics. On the one hand, this can lead to a fragmenta-
tion of the public arena to multiple discrete public arenas. Tensions can emerge around 
different needs and values of various groups. On the other hand, there can be a positive 
impact of diversity, because diversity can be a source of innovation. In general, this 
driver represents a big uncertainty on a long term. 
 Growing socio-economic inequalities  
Socio-economic inequality is the “classic” reason for political participation, which is 
also analyzed as class struggle. 
The inequality is high in Russia and it is growing. The number of people living in 
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12.6% of the population) and in 2011 it increased to 20.2 million people (which was 
14.3% of the population). According to official data (expert say that the real ratio can be 
higher) the ratio of incomes of 10% of the richest people to the 10% of the poorest peo-
ple has doubled during the past 20 years. In 2009 the  
In relation to civic activism, the outcomes of growing most affluent 20% Russians 
possessed 47.8% of all incomes while the least secured people had only 5.1% of in-
comes (Sampliev 2012). Inequalities can be: fragmented civil society, isolation of cer-
tain social and cultural groups, potential rise in gated communities and rise in small, 
single issue focused forms of associational life. 
5.2.3 Political drivers 
 Legislative regulation of civic life by the state 
Since the first Vladimir Putin’s presidency, much legislation regulating civic activi-
ties have been issued. Among the latest laws are: strengthening punishments for unsanc-
tioned protests (Herszenhorn 2012), the law about “foreign agents” (Human Rights 
Watch 2013), the law about volunteers (Globalvoicesonline 2012). 
These measures are coming from fears of uprisings similar to “orange revolution” in 
Ukraine at the end of 2004 – the beginning of 2005 and Arab spring started in Arab 
countries in 2010. Russian state regards international non-governmental organizations 
as active participants and organizers of revolutions, mentioned above. The fact that fi-
nancing of these NGOs was coming largely from western countries creates fears that 
revolutions were helped by some western states seeking their own interests in changing 
governments or destabilizing situation in countries. In other words, strengthening civic 
activities regulation comes as a part of security agenda. 
This new legislation restricts civic activists’ ability to speak and organize demonstra-
tions, therefore public arena is narrowing. Alternatively, the protest may become in-
creasingly “unofficial”, such as leaderless demonstrations. 
 Corruption 
The problem of corruption is quite serious in Russia. The study of Russian Public Opin-
ion Center conducted in 2012 revealed that 48% of Russians are worried by the spread 
of corruption (NEWSru.com 2012). According to the other study, conducted by Romir, 
in 2013 about 30% of Russians were bothered by corruption, while in 2014 this figure 
increased up to 40% (Romir 2014).  
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5.2.4 Economic drivers 
 Economic crisis 
The starting economic crisis in Russia creates a large uncertainty for the future. As men-
tioned in the introductory chapter, the growth of Russian GDP has slowed down in 2013 
and the rate of GDP growth is forecasted to be in the range from 2.1% to 3% maximum 
in 2014-2022, which is lower than it was in the first decade of 2000s. Some economists 
even project GDP decline (see, for example, Navigator-Kirov Business Portal 2013). In 
other words, there is evidence to expect that the next decade will be less successful for 
Russia than the previous one. This fact can lead to the decline of the fall of living stand-
ards resulting in social and political unrest. 
On the other hand, some Russian economists say that there are chances to recover 
economy however the economic policy should be changed radically. Whether the gov-
ernment is able to change the existing economic policy in time create a large uncertainty 
for the future.  
According to L. I. Jakobson (2008, 6-7), in the period of crisis self-organization of 
citizens can be a mitigatory factor for the crisis situation and a factor of successful res-
toration after the end of crisis. However, in the period of crisis break up of self-
organization is also a possibility, as well as its destructive outcomes. The outcome de-
pends, firstly, on the state of civil society at the beginning of crisis and, secondly, on the 
readiness and ability of state to find mutual understanding with civil society associa-
tions. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter was focused on creation the list of driving forces which will be used in 
the following Dellphi questionaire. Driving forces were identified through the literature 
review and also by means of brainstorming. Also, the principle of minimising the 
number of drivers in the questionaire was followed. As a result, the ten drivers were 
identified. These drivers can be grouped into four categories: technological (spread of 
information and communication technologies and emerging possibilities for 
crowdfunding), social (generations change, spreading values of individualism, 
migration, multi-nationality and growing socio-economic inequality), political 
(legislative regulation of civic life and corruption) and economic (economic crisis) 
drivers.  
The list of drivers, presented in the chapter, is regarded as hypothetic, rather than full 




6 COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERTS’ OPINIONS - 
THE DELPHI STUDY 
The general methodological approach and characteristics of research methods were ob-
served in Chapter 2. The current part of the master’s thesis focuses on the practical as-
pects of Delphi method realization in the present study. 
6.1 The goal of the Delphi study 
While the ultimate goal of the study is to build scenarios for citizens’ political participa-
tion in Russia in the future, Delphi method is used as a part of scenario-building pro-
cess. At the first step of the research, operationalization of the main concepts was made 
and the preliminary list of driving forces was formed through a literature review. In or-
der to produce more reliable scenarios in the end, it is important to get expert judgments 
in addition to the review of the literature sources. Delphi method is used in order to col-
lect experts’ evaluations. 
Expert judgments are collected on the most important aspects of the topic under in-
vestigation. Concretely, the following sub-goals were considered as tasks for a Delphi 
study: 
1. To collect experts’ opinions about driving forces of citizens’ political partici-
pation in the present and in the past 5-14 years. 
2. To evaluate each of driving forces collected through a literature review in 
terms of their importance level and probable impact for the future years 2014-
2025.  
3. To find new driving forces, which were not considered before by the litera-
ture review and the documentary analysis of the secondary research material. 
4. To evaluate future perspectives of different political participation forms in 
2014-2025. 
5. To get new ideas on possible forms of political participation in 2014-2025, 
which were not considered before by the literature review and the documen-
tary analysis of the secondary research material. 
6. To evaluate future perspectives of state-citizens relationships in 2014-2025.  
7. To get new ideas on possible relationships models between citizens and the 
state in 2014-2025, which were not considered before by the literature review 
and the documentary analysis of the secondary research material. 
8. To collect information about the desirable future of political participation in 
2014-2025 in the opinion of experts. 
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Overall, Delphi study aims at getting expert judgments on the past and current situa-
tion with political participation and their visions about its’ evolution in the future.  
6.2 Delphi study execution 
The process of the Delphi study included the following steps: 
1. Construction questionnaire for the 1st round. 
2. Recruiting participants; 
3. Conducting the 1st round of the study (questionnaire); 
4. Conducting personal in-depth interviews with participants;  
5. Preparing the feedback summary report; 
6. Construction questionnaire for the 2nd round; 
7. Conducting the 2nd round of the study (questionnaire); 
8. Analysis of results. 
Steps 2-7 were carried out from September 2014 till November 2014. 
6.2.1 Questionnaires and interviews 
In general the questionnaire was designed according to major goals of the Delphi 
study described above. Thus, both 1
st
 round and 2
nd
 round questionnaires included three 
blocks: 
 Evaluation of driving forces; 
 Forms of political participation; 
 Models of state-citizens relationships.  
Questions in questionnaires were based on operationalization, developed in the 
Chapter 3, and the list of driving forces described in the Chapter 5.  
The questionnaire was constructed on the principle of mixed approach, meaning the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data in one study. Such an approach in Del-
phi studies has been described, for example by Tapio et al. (2011b). In-line with the 
mixed approach, the questionnaire was designed to obtain both numerical evaluations 
(quantitative data) and textual argumentations (qualitative data). Additional qualitative 
data was gathered through interviews, where experts gave more argumentation for their 
numerical evaluations. 
The goal of the 2
nd
 round was to re-measure experts’ opinions therefore in the 2
nd
 
round questions were partly repeated from the 1
st
 round. However, questionnaires of 
two rounds were not identical, as the first round results indicated a need to elaborate 
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parts of the questionnaire.  Table 10 compares questionnaires’ structures in both rounds. 
Questionnaires can be also found in the Appendix 1, at the end of this paper.  
Table 10 Comparison of questionnaires structures in the 1
st








Part 1. Evaluation of driving forces 
Driving forces which have been influencing in the 
past 14 years – numerical evaluation 
- 
 
Driving forces which have been influencing in the 
past 14 years – argumentation 
- 
 
Driving forces which will influence in the future 
(2014-2025 years) – numerical evaluation 
Driving forces which will influence in the future 
(2014-2025 years) – numerical evaluation 
Driving forces which will influence in the future 
(2014-2025 years) – argumentation 
Driving forces which will influence in the future 
(2014-2025 years) – argumentation 
Part 2. Forms of political participation 
Involvement in various forms of participation in 
the past 4-5 years – numerical evaluation 
- 
 
Projected level of involvement in various forms of 
political participation in the future (2014-2025) – 
numerical evaluation 
Projected level of involvement in various forms of 
political participation in the future (2014-2025) – 
numerical evaluation 
N/A 
Involvement in various forms of participation in 
the future (2014-2025) – argumentation 
Part 3. Models of state-citizens relationships 
State-citizens relationships in the past 4-5 years – 
numerical evaluation 
- 
Projected models of state-citizens relationships in 
the future (2014-2025) – numerical evaluation 
Projected models of state-citizens relationships in 
the future (2014-2025) – numerical evaluation 
N/A 
State-citizens relationships in the future (2014-
2025) – argumentation 
Desired state-citizens relationships in the future 
(2014-2025) – numerical evaluation 
- 
Desired state-citizens relationships in the future 
(2014-2025) – vision of it can be achieved 
- 
In order to leave completing the questionnaire in a reasonable timing for a respond-
ent less questions requiring argumentation in writing were included in the 1
st
 round. At 
the same time, after the 1
st
 round some experts were additionally interviewed in person 
with a purpose of getting more detailed argumentation of their responses. In the 2
nd
 
round, questions about recent past and desired future were removed and instead more 
questions requiring argumentation in words were added. Such an approach allowed col-
lecting enough quantitative and qualitative information for further scenario-building. 
Questions for personal interviews were tailored for each participant individually, ac-
cording to his or her answers in a Delphi questionnaire. Interviews were aimed at con-
cretization of the logic behind numerical evaluations and clarification if points in argu-
mentation written in the questionnaire were not completely clear.    
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Questionnaires were crafted as MS Word files and then distributed and collected by 
e-mail. Each personal interview was conducted online and lasted for approximately 30 
minutes. Interviews were carried out only with those experts who had extra time for an 
interview. Thus, out of 11 participants 8 were interviewed.  
The questionnaire survey and interviews were conducted in Russian language (re-
spondents’ mother tongue). Therefore, all primary data collected in the Delphi study 
was in Russian.    
6.2.2 Selection and characteristics of participants 
As described in previous chapters, Delphi method involves experts in a certain field as 
participants. In the present study three types of experts were considered: 
1. People who either participate actively in social or political life in Russia in some 
form (party members, members of any civic association, volunteers, and partici-
pants/organizers of some social initiative or social movement). These people 
were regarded as having a “practical knowledge” in the field they are involved 
in. At the same time, it was attempted to involve those practitioners, who hold 
positions of leaders or managers in their activity. The assumption behind it was 
that such people are more likely to be able to see bigger picture (not just a nar-
row part of their activity).   
2. “Academics” or “theorists”: people who conduct research of political participa-
tion in Russia. 
3. State officials dealing at some point with political participation of citizens.  
Thus, the main criteria for selecting a participant for the study was belonging to one 
of three groups mentioned above. There were no quotas for types of expertise set prior 
to the recruitment process because practically, with given resources, quotas would be 
difficult to meet. However, it was attempted to invite people with various types of activ-
ity, supporting different political views and coming from different geographical areas of 
Russia.  
Overall, 50 invitations were sent. Out of them 20 people agreed to participate in the 
study, but only 11 of them (8 males and 3 females) sent their answers on questionnaires. 
The majority of participants are living and working in Moscow, however, there were 
also representatives of St. Petersburg, Komi republic, Sakha republic (Yakutia) and 
Krasnoyarsk region.  
Table 11 presents an expert matrix of those who participated in the study, based on 
how experts themselves characterized their areas of activity. If a respondent is active in 
a certain area it was considered as his expertise. 
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ber of the 
Russian Fed-
eration 
Expert 1 x x x     
Expert 2 x   x   x 
Expert 3     x x  
Expert 4    x  x  
Expert 5    x    
Expert 6     x   
Expert 7    x  x  
Expert 8    x    
Expert 9 x      x 
Expert 10      x  
Expert 11      x  
As shown in the Table 11, many experts are related to several areas of expertise sim-
ultaneously. There were no “pure” academics or “state representatives”: all respondents 
had some practical experience, too.  
The category “church” in the table is not a type of political participation as such 
however church representatives are often involved in various types of NGOs and usual-
ly actively react and comment on different events in the society. Thus, “church” was 
marked in the table as a distinct expertise category.  
The position of “Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation” category in the expert 
matrix is rather controversial. Civic Chamber is not a grassroots civic association, but it 
is not completely a government organization. It is an organization which was estab-
lished by the Russian federal law “On Public Chamber of the Russian Chamber” and it 
performs such functions as connecting government and civil society in Russia, support-
ing private citizens’ initiatives or NGOs, executing public control over government ac-
tivity etc. (Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation.) However, in the current study 
participants related to the Civic Chamber will be considered as having “state representa-
tive” expertise. Though they do not perform any decision-making in the government, 
they are more involved in the communication with state powers and are more controlled 
by state officials than a general civic association. Therefore, we consider them as having 
more expertise about state’s policies, state’s actions and methods of work. 
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6.3 Data analysis 
6.3.1 Approach to data analysis 
The present study uses the Disaggregative Delphi approach for scenarios building. For 
this purpose, the general strategy of Delphi results analysis will be the classification of 
expert opinions into several homogenous groups. Each of these opinion groups will be-
come a basis for a scenario. 
As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, the study uses a mixed approach by ob-
taining both qualitative and quantitative material. Thus, after the Delphi survey execu-
tion both numerical and textual data will be available. Both types of these data can be 
used to perform the task of classification. As Tapio et al. (2011b, 1621) argue that both 
qualitative and quantitative data can be used as a core in scenarios building or as a sup-
portive, illustrative material.  
In the current study, on the first step of analysis, the search for similarities in numeri-
cal answers will be conducted. One good method for this is cluster analysis (Tapio 
2002). Cluster analysis is a formal method of analysis, which is widely used and is in-
cluded in statistical software. In this study, the SPSS software was used for running a 
cluster analysis.  
There are different algorithms of conducting cluster analysis, such as: hierarchical 
cluster analysis, k-means cluster analysis, two-step cluster analysis and others. The pre-
sent study uses hierarchical cluster analysis, as this analysis allows studying the struc-
ture of data visually: the researcher can see all steps of classification visualized at a 
dendrogram. The division to the clusters is done by a researcher through the analysis of 
a dendrogram. Cluster analysis does not require random sampling and can be used as a 
tool for grouping answers without measuring statistical significance (Dubes & Jain 
1979).  
On the second step of work with Delphi data, the qualitative material is analyzed. 
The qualitative material includes textual argumentations, which experts wrote down in 
the questionnaire and transcripts of interviews with experts. Qualitative material will be 
used in two ways: 
1. To build scenarios from obtained quantitative clusters. It was previously 
discussed that scenario is a story. Thus, some explanation and argumenta-
tion should be added to numerical clusters in order to give meaning to the 
quantitative data, explanation of causes and effects to create a narrative.   
2. To identify additional groups of opinions among experts. Qualitative data 
can be also used for classification of “outliers”: experts, whose numerical 
estimations differ significantly from opinions of other experts. An outlier 
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can be classified as a separate “group” or combined with other respondents 
in a group on the basis of quantitative data. In case the number of outliers is 
great, qualitative material can be used to check, whether it is possible to 
form groups out of them. 
6.3.2 Data analysis in practice: hierarchical cluster analysis 
For running a cluster analysis in SPSS in is important to select variables for classifica-
tion and choose a necessary measure and a cluster method.  
Selecting variables for classification is a critical choice for conducting a cluster anal-
ysis (Tapio 2002, 93). The central goal of the study is to describe scenarios for the fu-
ture development of political participation. This goal includes two research questions: 
the question about the forms of political participation and the question about futures 
models of state-civil society relationships. Therefore, questions related to these research 
questions are candidates for inclusion into a cluster analysis. 
The question about future forms of participation is formulated as follows (see also 
Appendix 1): “Imagine the possible scenario for the future. Under this scenario, how 
the involvement in these forms of participation (the share of population involved) will 
change in the next 10-11 years (2014-2025)?” The list of participation forms was pro-
posed for expert evaluation: 
 1 – Involvement will dramatically decrease; 
 2 – Involvement will decrease a lot; 
 3 – Involvement will somewhat decrease; 
 4 – Involvement will not change; 
 5 – Involvement will somewhat increase; 
 6 – Involvement will increase a lot; 
 7 – Involvement will dramatically increase.  
The list of participation, provided for evaluation, included 18 forms of participation, 
described in the operationalization of the main concepts of the current study (Chapter 
3.6). After the first round, the new form of participation, proposed by a participant, was 
added to the list – “passive protest”. However, an option “passive protest” was excluded 
from cluster analysis, because not all respondents evaluated it. Overall, 18 forms of citi-
zens’ political participation were proposed for evaluation. 
The question about the future models of state-society relationships was formulated 
as: “Imagine a possible scenario for the future. How models of state-citizens relation-
ships in Russia will be changing under this scenario during the next 10-11 years (2014-
2025)?” The list of proposed relationships models was built in-line with the operational-
ization done in the Chapter 3.2. Experts evaluated proposed models using 7-point 
ordinal scale:  
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 1 – Model prevalence will dramatically decrease;  
 2 – Model prevalence will decrease significantly; 
 3 – Model prevalence will somewhat decrease; 
 4 – Situation will remain the same as in the present time; 
 5 – Model prevalence will somewhat increase; 
 6 – Model prevalence will significantly increase;  
 7 – Model prevalence will dramatically increase. 
Firstly, an attempt to build clusters using both variables was done. However, such an 
approach did not bring meaningful results. Therefore, it was decided to build cluster 
analysis on the basis of the question about participation forms and use the question 
about relationship models as a complement to resulting clusters. 
In addition, the number of options in the question about forms of political participa-
tion was reduced. The forms of participation were combined into meaningful categories 
(for example, “parties” of “NGOs”), new variables were calculated in SPSS (evaluation 
of such category was calculated as a mean of all scores given to its components). The 
table below shows, how categories were united. 
Table 12 Combined categories of political participation forms 
 
Forms of participation from the questionnaire
8
 
Merging forms of partici-
pation in categories 
1. Perceiving politics as important and following political news 
Combined to a category 
“Interest to politics” 2. 
Active interest in politics (discussions of political issues with others, 
active Internet political participation etc.) 
3. Identifying with a certain ideology or party Combined to a category 
“Parties” 4. Being a party member 
5. Voting at elections  
6. 
Contacting politicians or their representatives (personally or through 
on-line forms of communication) 
 
7. Donating money for political parties or selected candidates Combined to a category 
”Charity and 
crowdfunding” 
15. Donating money to charity or NGOs 
8. Voluntary work for a party Combined to a category 
”Volunteering in general” 18. Voluntary work for NGOs, orphanage houses, homes for elderly etc. 
9. Politically motivated consumption  
10. Signing petitions  
11. Involvement in social movements  
12. Participation in peaceful protests, demonstrations, strikes and so on 
Combined to a category 
“Protests and disobedience” 
13. Participation in violent demonstrations 
14. Civil disobedience 
17. Membership in NGO  
16. Short-term self-organization for solving urgent issues  
 As shown in the Table 12, 7 forms of participation were not grouped in categories 
and were used in a cluster analysis as separate components. At the same time, 11 other 
                                                 
8
 Option “passive protest (demonstrative non-participation in elections)” was excluded from analysis, as 
not all respondents evaluated it. 
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forms of participation were grouped into 5 categories: “Interest to politics”, “Parties”, 
“Charity and crowdfunding”, “Volunteering in general” and “Protests and disobedi-
ence”. Overall, 12 variables were run in cluster analysis.  
As evaluations in the question were based on ordinal scale, for calculating distances 
between objects and clusters “chi-square” measure is selected. (Statistics Solutions) As 
a cluster method we use Average Linkage (Between Groups), set by default. There was 
no standardization of data done, because all data had the same scale of measurement. 
Firstly, the question about the projections of the future political participation forms is 
analyzed. The Figure 6 presents a dendrogram showing the process of grouping objects, 
according to distances between them. 
 
 
Figure 6 Dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis: the future of political 
participation forms 
From the dendrogram (Figure 6) it can be concluded that there are two groups of ex-
perts with quote similar views: the first group includes experts 6, 8, 1 and 4, the second 
group includes experts 7, 10 and 3. These groups can be counted as 2 clusters. Experts 
numbered as 2, 9, 5 and 11 can be classified as outliers, as their responses differ more 
and cannot be considered as members of any cluster. Table 13 shows how single experts 
and experts grouped into clusters evaluated the future of political participation forms. 
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Table 13 Detailed characteristics of clusters based on evaluation of future partici-
pation forms 
  
Cluster 1  
(experts  
6,8,1,4) 
Cluster 2  
(experts  
7,10,3) 
Expert 2 Expert 5 Expert 9 Expert 11 
Interest in politics 5,0 6,3 2,5 4,5 5,0 2,0 
Parties 4,0 4,7 2,0 2,0 3,5 2,5 
Voting at elections 3,0 5,3 3,0 4,0 4,0 7,0 
Personal communication with politicians 4,0 5,3 3,0 2,0 4,0 3,0 
Political consumption 4,5 3,0 6,0 2,0 5,0 2,0 
Petitions 5,0 5,3 4,0 5,0 5,0 3,0 
Social movements 5,3 5,7 5,0 2,0 5,0 4,0 
Protests and disobedience 5,3 5,9 4,7 5,0 2,0 2,0 
Charity and crowdfunding 4,4 5,0 3,0 2,0 3,5 5,0 
Short-term self organization 6,0 5,3 5,0 6,0 6,0 7,0 
NGO membership 5,3 5,7 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 
Volunteering in general 4,4 5,2 3,0 3,0 4,0 3,5 
Thus, after running a cluster analysis we identified two groups of experts with simi-
lar opinions on the future forms of political participation. In addition, there are several 
experts who became outliers based on the formal cluster analysis. On the next step, the 
analysis of numerical data is combined with textual material. As a result, the logic of 
scenarios was drafted from the obtained clusters and new scenarios lines from the anal-
ysis of outliers were created. 
6.3.3 Elaboration of cluster analysis with qualitative material 
In order not to make the chapter too long all textual argumentations given by experts are 
not provided here. Instead, only conclusions from the analysis of these argumentations 
are described.  
Respondents, related to the cluster 1 (experts 6, 8, 1 and 4) tend to think that interest 
to politics will increase in the future, conditioned by the worsening of economic situa-
tion and declining living standards. The number of problems in the society will increase 
and therefore people’s self-organization will dramatically increase in order to solve lo-
cal problems. On a county scale, people will join more around a complex of problems, 
therefore, participation in social movements increases. People loose trust into old parties 
and elections. Instead, new parties emerge (including religion-based parties). Some par-
ties become revolutionary and take a leading role in protests and civic disobedience. 
Through participation in social movements and new political parties young people learn 
to create horizontal networks and become less inclined to authoritarian type of power.  
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Respondents, joined into the cluster 2 (experts 7, 10 and 3), though give similar 
scores for some forms of political participation, argument their evaluations quite differ-
ently. Thus, expert 7 presents a revolutionary scenario, which is different from experts 
10 and 3 (it should be noted that expert 5, which is not included into the cluster, pre-
sents a revolutionary scenario, similarly to expert 7). At the same time, expert 3 gives 
explanations similar to experts joined in cluster 1, described above, as he tends to pro-
ject the rise of “participatory democracy” (together with high protest activity), the trans-
formation of political parties and the decline of voter turnout. Thus, the cluster 2 in its 
initial form cannot produce a scenario however a revolutionary scenario can be generat-
ed from answers of experts 5 and 7. 
The rest of experts, numbered 2, 9 and 11, have some overlaps in evaluations and ar-
gumentation and some significant differences as well. Therefore, it is not possible to 
join them into a single cluster. However, we can use those ideas of these experts, which 
add a new story-line compared to two scenarios drafted above. A different scenario 
emerges, if we select the following possible trends: decline of interest in politics, de-
cline of party activity, growth of elections turnout, declined protest activity and declined 
participation in NGOs. The picture similar to this one is presented by expert 11. 
Thus, the cluster analysis in combinations with qualitative data analysis produced 
three clusters. These clusters are based on experts’ evaluation of the future forms of 
political participation and future development of state-society relationship models. 
6.4 Conclusions 
Delphi study in the current project aims at collecting experts’ judgments on the key re-
search topics, namely: driving forces for political participation, forms of political partic-
ipation, and relationships between the civil society and the state. The main tasks of the 
Delphi study gave the framework for the questionnaire design. 
The study involved 11 participants from different regions of Russia, with versatile 
areas of expertise, political attitudes and preferences. Attitudes of some participants 
were so different that it is less likely that they could peacefully communicate in a face-
to-face discussion. In this context Delphi method proved its effectiveness as a way of 
collective discussion organization. 
The study uses the mixed approach by combining qualitative and quantitative types 
of questions in a questionnaire. On the stage of Delphi data analysis, both qualitative 
and quantitative material was used to classify expert opinions into groups, according to 
similarities of their responses. As a result, three groups (clusters) were identified. These 
groups will become a basis for scenarios. The final scenario stories will be created by a 
researcher on the basis of Delphi data. 
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7 SCENARIO BUILDING 
This chapter presents the final step in the current study – fleshing out scenarios for the 
future of political participation in Russia in 2014-2025 years.  
In the beginning of the chapter, the situation in political participation in Russia in the 
recent years is described (main drivers of participation, the dominant participation forms 
and models of state-society relationships) based on Delphi study results. After that, the 
driving forces for the future are outlined, according to expert evaluations. At the end, 
three probable scenarios for future are described and preferable vision for the future is 
presented. 
7.1 Political participation in the past years 
In addition to the analysis in Chapter 4, which is based on a literature review, the cur-
rent chapter presents an analysis of past events and present situation, based on experts’ 
evaluations. 
7.1.1 Driving forces of the recent past 
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Question: In your opinion, how strong has been the influence of the following factors on political partic-
ipation in Russia in the past 14 years (2000-2014)? The scale: 1 – “unimportant, no influence”, 2 – “al-
most no influence”, 3 – “weak influence”, 4 – “moderate influence”, 5 – “influence higher than average”, 




Figure 7 Evaluation of the strength of influence of different factors in the past 10-
14 years 
In addition to factors mentioned in questionnaire, respondents had an opportunity to 
propose additional factors, which they consider as important. As a result, a number of 
factors, which influenced on political participation in the past years, were added to the 
list presented above: 
 Factors with a very strong influence: 
o Elections fraud; 
o Economic reforms (monetization of benefits, cuts in social benefits); 
o Authoritarian tendencies in governance. 
 Factors with “higher than average” and “strong” influence: 
o Development of the state grant programs; 
o Development of philanthropy as a norm among commercial organiza-
tions; 
o State media policy; 
o Civic activists gained experience in organization of big actions; 
o Political repressions; 
o Russia’s foreign policy (Georgia, Ukraine); 
o Confrontation with western countries; 
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 Factors with medium influence: 
o Destroying political freedoms. 
According to expert estimation, in the past 10-14 years the strongest influence on po-
litical participation of citizens in Russia had the factors of information and communica-
tion technologies (ICT) and corruption. Interestingly, the evaluations of ICT role in the 
past are characterized by higher consensus compared to evaluations of other factors 
(standard deviation, shown in Figure 7, for the ICT factor scores is one of the lowest 
among other factors).    
The factor of corruption had a controversial influence on citizens’ political participa-
tion. On the one hand, awareness of corruption reduces trust to political institutions in 
the society, including trust in fairness of elections. As a result, elections turnout de-
clines, citizens become more passive, because they do not believe they can change 
something. At the same time, corruption worsens the quality of state governance which 
in the long run creates discontent of the current situation among citizens. Citizens be-
come more ready to protest against the system. Experts mention that the topic of corrup-
tion was largely exploited in the past years by various politicians in order to mobilize 
people for a protest:  
“This is the main agenda, which is used by opposition political actors. 
Initially, mass demonstrations in December 2011, began as a protest 
against corruption”. (Interviewee B) 
Together with corruption, the socio-economic factors (socio-economic inequality, 
some economic reforms, the beginning of economic crisis) and fraud at elections were 
also leading to the increase of citizens’ discontent.  
While mentioned factors lead to a rising discontent in the society and growing desire 
among citizens to struggle for their rights, the factor of ICT spread made it easier for 
citizens to participate in political life. The influence of growing ICT penetration and 
usage in the past years, according to experts, in general leads to the two major effects: 
 Enhanced communication between people (simplification of communication, 
the emergence of new communication methods); 
 Faster information spread. 
 In terms of consequences for political life and political participation, the spread of 
ICT has lead to: 
 Increased transparency of political system; 
 It became easier to find like-minded people; 
 Reaction on events became faster; 
 Awareness about politics increased; 
 Emerged uncensored alternative to traditional media; 
 Emerged new practices of political participation; 
 A new mobilization channel emerged; 
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 It became easier to coordinate collective actions. 
At the same time, experts mentioned that the strength of influence of this factor is of-
ten overestimated. In fact, ICT have not changed in a quality manner: 
 People’s attitudes; 
 Motivation for political participation; 
 Practices of political participation; 
 Have not lead to significant media liberalization. 
There was some disagreement among experts in evaluation of whether ICT helped to 
attract new people into political activity or not. Some experts expressed an opinion that 
due to ICT spread new people, previously inactive, were attracted into political partici-
pation. Alternatively, other experts consider that ICT have not increased social base of 
political participation, have not engaged new people.   
Also, it was mentioned that while opportunities for political participation provided 
by the spread of ICT are growing, the state is also learning to work with Internet and to 
control it. 
Legislation in the area of socio-political activity was also a factor which influenced 
(moderately) on political participation in the past years. Experts mentioned that, on the 
one hand, the legislation created conditions for the development of civil society and 
stimulated citizens’ political participation. On the other hand, legislation increased the 
capacity of the state to force pressure on civic activists and narrowed down the area of 
legal political participation. Legislation of the past years caused the decline of protest 
activity, however, at the same time lead to the accumulation of discontent. Some experts 
expressed rather radical views saying that legislation of the past years “practically de-
stroyed the civil activity”, “liquidated political parties as institutions”, while other ex-
perts said that some new laws became “revolutionary” in stimulating citizens’ involve-
ment in decision-making at a local level. 
7.1.2 Forms of political participation and relationships with the state in the past 
The Table 14 presents the averaged evaluation of experts on the share of Russian cit-
izens involved in various forms of political participation in the past 4-5 years. Experts’ 
evaluations are shown in comparison with available statistical data. 
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Table 14 Share of citizens involved in various forms of political participation: ex-
pert estimation vs. statistical data 
 Average expert  
estimation/std. deviation 
Data obtained from literature review 
(see Chapter 4) 
Passive interest in politics (for exam-
ple, reading political news) 
36% (std. deviation – 27)  51% interest in general in 2012 (no 
division to active and passive) 
Voting at elections 33% (std. deviation – 16) On average in 2007-2012: 62% voters 
turnout at Parliament elections and 
67.5% at President elections
10
. In 
2007-2012 years the average voter 
turnout at regional parliament elections 
was 48% 
Active interest in politics (for exam-
ple, discussion about politics) 
29% (std. deviation – 25) 51% interest in general in 2012 (no 
division to active and passive) 
Identifying with a certain ideology or 
party 
21% (std. deviation – 17) Party support - 58% in 2014. Ideology 
support - 95% of citizens aged 18-55 
in 2012. 
Short-term self-organization for solv-
ing urgent issues 
14% (std. deviation – 7) 5% 
Voluntary work for NGOs, orphan-
age houses, homes for elderly etc. 
9% (std. deviation – 13) 2% 
Involvement in social movements 9% (std. deviation – 12) .. 
Politically motivated consumption 9% (std. deviation – 18) .. 
Donating money to charity or NGOs 8% (std. deviation – 6) .. 
Membership in NGO 8% (std. deviation – 13) 2% 
Signing petitions 7% (std. deviation – 7) 2% in 2013 
Contacting politicians or their repre-
sentatives (personally or through on-
line forms of communication) 
7% (std. deviation – 7) .. 
Participation in peaceful protests, 
demonstrations, strikes and so on 
6% (std. deviation – 6) 3% in 2012 
Being a party member 5% (std. deviation – 6) 2-3% in 2013 
Voluntary work for a party 4% (std. deviation – 4) .. 
Donating money for political parties 
or selected candidates 
4% (std. deviation – 4) .. 
Participation in violent 
demonstrations 
2% (std. deviation – 3) .. 
Civil disobedience
11
 2% (std. deviation – 3) .. 
From the comparison of expert evaluations and statistical data it can be concluded 
that experts tend to give lower estimations for interest in politics (voter turnout in both 
columns cannot be directly compared because they are calculated from the different 
                                                 
10
 This figure is calculated out of the number people, who have voting rights (people older than 18 years), 
not from the all population of Russia. Therefore, the figure is not comparable with an expert estimation.  
11
 Deliberate law violation to attract attention to a certain issue. 
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bases). At the same time, they estimate involvement in short-term self-organization, 
voluntary work for NGOs, membership in NGOs, signing petitions, party membership 
and protest activity to be on a higher level than it is shown by statistical data. The low-
est consensus among experts was expressed in evaluation of the level of interest to poli-
tics, while the highest consensus was shown in evaluation of the level of civil disobedi-
ence and participation in violent protests. 
The Figure 8 presents evaluations of state-society relationships models, observed in 
the past 4-5 years. Evaluation was done using a 5-point scale, where “1” means that the 
model “was not observed at all” and “5” means that the model “was observed very often 
or in all situations”. The essence of each model was described in the Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 8 State-society relationships in the past 4-5 years, average scores 
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As seen from the data, in the past 4-5 years the state perceived civil society as an ad-
versary quite often and righted with it. As a result, the model of civil disobedience was 
presented from time to time. Less often, but relatively frequently the state followed the 
paternalistic model, using civic associations as the means to perform control over the 
society. Other models of relationships were observed rarely, according to experts’ opin-
ion. Overall, such vision of experts goes in-line with the observation of the main trends 
presented in the Chapter 4.  
7.2 Driving forces for the future (2014-2025) 
Scores and argumentation for the evaluation of driving forces importance were taken 
from the second round and interviews, under the assumption that by the second round 
experts reflected their opinions quite well. 
The evaluation of the importance of various drivers is presented in the Figure 10. The 
estimation was done using the scale from 1 to 7, where “1” means “unimportant, no 
influence” and “7” means “very strong influence”. 
 
Figure 10 Evaluation of the strength of influence of different factors in the future 
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Figure 11 Evaluation of the strength of influence of different factors in the future 
(2014-2025) vs. in the past 4-5 years, average scores 
In the future, compared to the past, the strength of some factors will increase, while 
other factors will influence with the same strength as in the past. Factors which will be 
more influential in the future than in the past: spread of ICT, crowdfunding, socio-
economic inequality, economic crisis, multi-nationality, regulation of civic activity by 
the state. Factors which will be influential at the similar level in the future compared to 
the past: corruption, generation change, migration, spread of individualistic values. 
There are multiple factors which will influence on the future. No single or even 2-3 
most important factors can be identified. The future of political participation will be 
defined by a complex of factors: technological, economic, social and political (state 
politics and governance). The factors, influence of which will be weak are “state grant 
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Technological factors (influence higher than average): 
 Spread of ICT (strong influence) 
Experts (on average) projected a certain growth of ICT influence strength in the fu-
ture.  
Information and communication technologies enhance connections between people 
by creating new possibilities for communication and the faster spread of uncensored 
information (news, political analytics, judgments etc.). For the future it means, that 
there will be conditions for the existence of communication environment, which will be 
available for masses of people and will be independent from the state. 
According to experts’ opinions, the existence of such communication environment 
will increase political participation in general: 
“Minimization of connections between people contributes to political 
passivity, even decadence. Conversely, accesses to the global network, 
the possibility to scoop out information from there, the relationship with 
other people serve to increase the level of citizens’ participation in polit-
ical life”. (Interviewee D)   
The spread of information and communication technologies increases abilities for 
citizens’ self-organization. For example, Internet-based tools for crowdfunding give an 
opportunity to collect money for independent projects; the instrument of on-line peti-
tions helps to create networks of people, interested in a certain issue and establish com-
munication within this network. Internet and social networks increase possibilities for 
citizens’ consolidation for certain actions. As a result, the possibility for mass social 
actions will increase in the future.         
ICT gives an opportunity for local political groups to advertise themselves and attract 
new supporters. In the future this could lead to the development of new political forces. 
At the same time, there is also a possibility that many small independent local groups 
will exist, their actions will not be coordinated and, as a result, the society will be frag-
ment and unable for big consolidated actions. However, there are also factors, which 
could force small local groups to start consolidating (one such factor, which was men-
tioned in the interview, is political repressions).    
To sum up, in the spread of ICT is projected to lead to the following effects in terms 
of citizens’ political participation: 
 Growth of involvement in political participation among citizens; 
 Increased probability of mass social actions; 
 Emergence of new political forces or fragmentation of society according to their 
“civic interests”. 
Overall, experts mention that the spread of ICT gives a chance for the development 
of independent from the state political participation in Russia. However, there are also 
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threats to this: from regulation and censorship in the Internet to shut down of the Inter-
net in the country.  
“This is one of the few chances for the further development of political 
activity, as it is more or less free zone, but the state is also gradually 
learning to regulate the Internet, this moment was not “overslept”, like it 
was in Egypt.” (Interviewee B) 
 Crowdfunding (influence higher than average) 
According to experts’ evaluations, the influence of crowdfunding will increase in the 
future, compared with the influence of this factor in the past. 
Crowdfunding, like the spread of ICT in general, potentially could lead to the growth 
of political participation which would be independent from the state, various funds and 
capital in general. Experts forecast that the role of crowdfunding in political and civic 
life in Russia will increase in the future. This will allow organizing political actions 
independently from the state and will increase influence of independent political and 
civic forces.  
For some citizens (those who do not have an opportunity to participate directly) 
crowdfunding can become a form of participation in political and civic life.  
Experts regard crowdfunding as an instrument with a high potential. However, in or-
der to make it influential, it is important to educate people, to explain how to use it.  
Economic factors (influence higher than average): 
Economic factors are projected to be more influential in the future, compared to the 
past. 
 Socio-economic inequality (influence higher than average) 
Experts admit that social-economic inequality is high in Russia:  
“There is a gap between rich and poor, between different regions, be-
tween officials and ordinary citizens. The gap is higher than in European 
countries, it is closer to Asian countries (there are extremely rich and ex-
tremely poor, while middle class is stable only in the big cities). There-
fore, the social problem in our country will always exist.” (Interviewee I) 
Experts forecast that socio-economic inequality will be increasing in the future (in 
case the social system will remain the same). In general, respondents agreed that socio-
economic inequality will lead to the growth of political participation. However, there 
are different opinions about to what extent it will influence on political participation. 
The following projections (more radical and less radical) were expressed through ques-
tionnaires and interviews: 
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 Growing socio-economic inequality will be the major factor for political partici-
pation in the future; 
 Growing socio-economic inequality will lead to increasing discontent in the so-
ciety; 
 Growing socio-economic inequality will lead to revolutionary situation. 
The factor of socio-economic inequality is tightly connected with the economic crisis 
– another economic factor which was evaluated as a strong driver for the future of polit-
ical participation.   
 Economic crisis (influence higher than average) 
Though on average the future influence of the factor “economic crisis” was evaluated 
as “higher than average”, the character of influence of the factor is uncertain. Mostly it 
is uncertain whether the crisis will be strong and the decline of living conditions will be 
catastrophic, or the crisis will influence only averagely on citizens’ living conditions. 
Worsening of people’s living conditions because of the crisis will lead to growing 
discontent and re-evaluation of state powers (meaning the change in the level of peo-
ple’s support of the existing leaders). However, mass protests and revolutionary scenar-
io are possible only if the crisis lead to catastrophic consequences (such as the mass 
layoffs, famine etc.). 
Some experts mentioned that economic crisis will be the major driving force of citi-
zens’ political participation, while other experts argued that economic factors are not so 
important and, instead, emotional factors will play more important role in the future. 
Emotional factors (influence higher than average): 
Emotional factors were mentioned in the first round by one expert and evaluated by 
the whole group of experts in the second round. Experts expressed different opinions 
about the importance of emotional factors in the future: some of them said that emo-
tional factors will be the most important for political participation in the future, while 
others mentioned, that emotional factors will be the less important, however, they may 
produce some impact for political participation. 
Opinion that emotional factors will be the most important for political participation 
was conditioned by recent protest movements in Russia and other countries. The pro-
tests happened in Russia in the past 2-3 years were motivated by events which produced 
significant emotional reaction in the society: fraud at parliament elections, law banning 
children adoption by USA citizens and Russian international politics in Ukraine. Some 
experts presume that this type of event will appear in the future and lead to increase in 
citizens’ participation.  
Alternative opinion implies that primarily economic (and other rational factors) will 
affect political participation in the future. Along with growing social and economic 
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problems, the social discontent will be escalating. In such conditions, events which in-
duce a significant emotional reaction among people may serve as a trigger for protests:  
“While citizens stay in the chronic depression, caused by dissatisfaction 
with their living conditions and the impossibility of achieving many im-
portant human life goals, events producing public resonance (for exam-
ple, a major disaster caused by an aging industrial infrastructure, police 
brutality against detainees, riots on national and social grounds, loss of 
life due to the poor quality of medical care or poor food quality, etc.) 
may be a "trigger" for revolution.” (Interviewee G) 
Thus, according to the described point of view emotional factors may spark citizens’ 
participation (primarily in a form of protests), under condition that there will be serious 
social and economic problems creating discontent in the society.  
It was also mentioned by experts that “a sense of community” can be understood as 
an emotional factor. For example, mass protests, when they involve many people, are 
able to create a sense of community. This sense of community stimulates new people 
either to participate in a protest or at least to follow the situation.  
Social (influence higher than average): 
 Declining elections trust in the society (influence higher than average) 
On average experts evaluated this factor as one of the three influential factors for po-
litical participation.  
Most experts agreed that trust in elections is very low in the society, as people be-
came more aware that elections results are falsified. As a result, people do not believe 
that state power can be changed through elections. At the same time citizens do not have 
real tools to change this situation: 
“As corruption, falsifications became a commonplace. Society has 
learned to identify them, but on the next step it comes to a dead end, be-
cause there are no actual mechanisms to fight with falsifications.” (In-
terviewee D) 
According to expert opinions, the declined elections trust leads to the decline of elec-
tions turnout and delegitimizing of state powers.  
Some experts also analyzed “declining elections trust” as a possible factor of citi-
zens’ mobilization. Points of view on this topic split. One point of view says that low 
elections trust will be one of the most important factors for protest mobilization. Ac-
cording to the other point of view, that awareness of election fraud was a mobilization 
factor in the past, however, it in the future it will not be the most important factor of 
mobilization (“only in a complex with other factors”).   
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 Migration (average influence) 
There was no consensus among experts in the character of migration influence on po-
litical participation. 
Some experts mentioned that migration by itself is not an influential issue for politi-
cal participation. However, migration creates xenophobia and grounds for the develop-
ment of nationalist or even fascist movements in the society:  
“In the Soviet Union we had a common international state idea (com-
munist, socialist), which united many different nationalities. After 1990 it 
was all destroyed, and even the opposite tendency started to grow: reli-
gious identity, national identity and nationalism. Illegal migration will 
lead to the growth of xenophobia (this problem also exists in Europe). 
This problem will be more and more used by different political forces.” 
(Interviewee I) 
Other experts said that the current trend in migration is the following: people sup-
porting liberal values tend to leave the country, while immigrants usually come from 
more archaic societies (mainly from Central Asian countries) and do not adhere to liber-
al values. Thus, if the current trend in migration will be stable, there will be a critical 
number of people in Russia, who will be not interested in democracy. 
There were also experts who noticed that increasing number of migrants in a society 
leads to establishing national associations, national diasporas. In the future these nation-
al communities will be interested in influencing political life in the country. This will 
lead to greater spread of lifestyle, culture, religion and way of life of migrant nationali-
ties. 
It was mentioned that many migrant nowadays are coming to Russia to work at low 
skilled and low paid jobs. This increases “proletarization” of the society. Taking into 
account bad working conditions of migrant workers, in the future they might start 
fighting for better working and living conditions. If joined with existing communist and 
socialist movements in the country, this situation can lead to the rise of communist and 
socialist values in Russian society in the future.      
 Generations change (average influence) 
Generations change represents, perhaps, one of the most uncertain factors of political 
participation in the future. Overall, the influence strength of this factor was evaluated as 
“average”, however experts gave not many concrete explanations of how it will influ-
ence on political participation.  
Among the given explanations of influence of the factor there are quite controversial 
opinions: 
 Younger generation will be more active in political participation than the pre-
vious generation; 
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 Younger generation will be passive in political participation; 
 The influence of the younger generation depends on how it will be socialized 
into political activity; 
 Young generation will bring new values into society, for example, current 
young people are less inclined towards authoritarian relations; 
 Young people may be more easily deceived by beautiful (but false) ideas than 
those who have gone through 90 years.  
Thus, the factor “generations change” can be classified as uncertainty for the future 
of political participation. 
 Multi-nationality (average influence) 
Similar to the previous factor of “generations change”, the influence of “multi-
nationality” factor is uncertain. Experts notice that the direction in which this factor will 
play out in the future depends on the state national policy. In the worst case this factor 
can awake separatist trends in the society. In the best case the factor of “multi-
nationality” will not influence on political participation. 
Experts admitted that the factor of “multi-nationality” will impact at people’s com-
munications on the household level. In the situation when there is no supranational idea 
or ideology in post-Soviet Russia, trends of rising religious and national identities are 
visible. As a result, when people migrate around the country, manifestation of a certain 
culture may be perceived aggressively in a territory of a different culture. This can cre-
ate small multinational conflicts, however, it is also possible that some political forces 
might speculate on such conflicts and bring them to a level of a societal problem. 
Political factors (average influence): 
 Authoritarian tendencies in governance (influence higher than average) 
On average experts evaluated influence of the factor as “higher than average”. Au-
thoritarian tendencies in governance will impact into reducing the attractiveness of the 
political regime in society. As a result, citizens will be more inclined to resist state poli-
cies, often in radical forms.  
 Confrontation with western countries (influence higher than average) 
Experts agreed that confrontation with western countries will be increasing in the fu-
ture and will strongly influence on political participation. However, the influence might 
be controversial.  
On the one hand, such confrontation will lead to the rise of patriotic feelings in the 
society. On the other hand, among a part of the society it may lead to fall of the state 
authority. Thus, confrontation with western countries may lead to split of attitudes to the 
state in the society. 
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Also, experts noted that the current confrontation will make western countries inter-
ested in changing power regime in Russia. To reach this goal western countries might 
increase financing of opposition groups inside Russia. At the same time, there might be 
a decrease of cooperation between Russian and western NGOs which will negatively 
influence primarily on liberal opposition, however, other types of opposition move-
ments (socialist, nationalist etc.), will be influenced to a less extent. 
 Regulation of civic and political activity by state legislation (influence higher 
than average) 
Part of experts agreed that legislative regulation of civic and political activity is nec-
essary, because it sets clear rules of activity. In addition, in the past years the state stim-
ulated civic activity through legislation, for example, through issuing grants to non-
governmental organizations and through the law about local governance, which gave 
more rights to local communities to participate in governance of their communities, 
regions. 
At the same time, other experts focused on limitations of the civic and political activ-
ities, which were set by the legislation in the past years (for example, laws about mass 
events, supervision of NGOs work etc.). Experts say that in the future there will be 
more limitations of civic and political activities, leading to narrowing down of legal 
area of political participation. As result, illegal political participation will be increasing. 
Also, non-parliament, non-system political activity will increase its importance. 
Some experts noted that the countering actions of the society against limitations 
should increase in the future. 
 
 Corruption (influence higher than average) 
Though, on average the factor of corruption was evaluated as strong, experts ex-
pressed quite different opinions about it. Some experts consider corruption as a constant 
factor (meaning that corruption stays on a stably high level, but citizens got used to it), 
therefore the acuteness of the problem declines and it will not produce any extra politi-
cal participation. Alternative opinion implies that corruption will increase in the situa-
tion of economic crisis and will motivate people to be more politically active. 
Overall, the following effects were mentioned as a result of corruption influence: 
systemic crisis of state power, growing discontent (in perspective leading to revolution-
ary situation, distrust in political system, decline in elections turnout, political passive-
ness (however, there is an opposite opinion that awareness about corruption will make 
people more active). 
 Media policy (influence higher than average) 
Media influence on what citizens think, how they evaluate social, economic, political 
and other events. State media will work towards reducing discontent in the society. At 
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the same time, the role of alternative media, independent and oppositional media will be 
increasing (especially along with worsening of the economic situation). Therefore, al-
ternative media will be also influencing social consciousness.   
 Idea of external enemy (average influence) 
Experts mentioned that idea of external enemy leads to rising patriotism in the socie-
ty and consolidation of the society around state powers. As society becomes consolidat-
ed it easier “forgives” economic problems and policy mistakes. Thus, protest form of 
political participation become less probable. At the same time, a part of the society be-
comes in opposition to state policies. Society becomes polarized. Most of the society 
becomes suspicious towards opposition groups. 
 Political repressions (average influence) 
Some experts project that the amount of political repressions will decrease in the 
nearest future. Instead, there will be institutional changes which will limit opposition 
opportunities to influence of state policies. Experts with alternative opinions claim that 
political repressions will rise in the future. As a result, this will lead to radicalization of 
political participation. 
It can be concluded from the analysis of experts’ responses that there are almost no 
clearly predetermined factors for the future of political participation. However, it is pos-
sible to highlight trends that are more likely to exist in the future and influence political 
participation. These are: the spread of ICT and crowdfunding, worsening economic sit-
uation, existence of corruption, regulation of civic and political life, low elections trust 
and confrontation with western countries. At the same time, there are a number of un-
certainties, for example, whether the state will adopt a censorship/limitations policy for 
the Internet? and how severe economic crisis will be? The most predetermined element 
is that in the period from 2014 till 2025 a generation change will be happening, and 
younger generation will become more active in social and political life. However, it is 
uncertain, how generations change will impact on political participation. 
7.3 Fleshing out possible scenarios for the future 
The relationship between various driving forces, described above, might lead to several 
alternative directions of the development of political participation in the future. Below, 
three possible scenarios for the future of political participation in 2014-2015 years in 
Russia are described.  
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7.3.1 “Engaged citizens in the authoritarian state” 
Since 2014 Russia has entered a long-term economic depression. The following 2-3 
years become very hard for Russian economy. After that the situation stabilizes, howev-
er till 2025 the economy does not show a sufficient growth and the standards of living 
which people got used to in the beginning of 2000s remain in the past. In addition, the 
confrontation and distrust with western countries remains, though it is not so tense as in 
was in 2014. 
Together with accumulated governance problems (high level of corruption, low trust 
in political institutions) the economic crisis leads to slow worsening of people’s living 
conditions and growing socio-economic inequality. Though the economic situation is 
far worse compared to the years 2005-2007 or even to the years 2012-2013, it does not 
decline catastrophically: people do not suffer from hunger and continue to receive some 
social benefits. However, major problems are not solved and discontent about govern-
ment’s actions and policies is rising in the society. People become more interested in 
politics, follow political news to understand the essence of happening events and 
searching for new political forces that could represent their opinions in political deci-
sion-making. 
The trust in old political parties declines. People do not see that these parties express 
their interests. In general, the role of parliament parties in political decision-making 
declines. Instead, authoritarian tendencies and “vertical of power” remains, though its 
effectiveness is declining. The president relies on specially created advisory boards, 
rather than on political parties.  
At the same time parliament remains, but it has a decorative function of a nominal 
democratic institution. Though parliament elections are held regularly, showing the ap-
pearance of democracy, all parties are going through a loyalty check before being al-
lowed to participate in elections. Apart from that parliament parties do not have strong 
ideologies and do not represent people’s desires. However, parliament parties manage to 
sustain the number of its members. For most of its members party becomes an instru-
ment to enhance career-building. As a result, support of parties declines in the society.  
After the liberalization of legislation, happened in 2012, the registration of new polit-
ical parties became easier. As a result, a lot of new parties were created. However in 
2015-2016 years the number of parties is declining, as many of them are not going have 
not gone through financial checks and have not managed to meet other formal require-
ments.  
People are becoming more pessimistic about old parties, more disappointed by them. 
However, new parties are organized and people see new hope in them. In the parliament 
elections of 2016 new parties participate in elections. Radical parties or other parties not 
approved by the state are not allowed to participate in elections but several new parties 
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still emerge (and even go through elections in the parliament). Parties with “state-
protective” rhetoric become more popular than liberal parties.   
Thus parliament elections of 2016 attract more voters since the beginning of 2000s. 
Before 2016 people are eager to become members of new parties and support parties. 
They believe that something can be changed thought parties activity. However, the role 
of parties is declining. As a result, after 2016 people become more and more disap-
pointed by parliament parties. 
Elections turnout declines visibly already at parliament elections in 2021. Citizens 
become disappointed with the possibility to change something in the country through 
elections. They become more inclined to a passive protest (demonstrative non-
participation in elections). 
In president elections the trend is declining voters’ turnout. It is conditioned by the 
fact that citizens trust less in the possibility of power change through elections. Howev-
er, elections turnout does not fall down dramatically, because still rather big number of 
people habitually perceive voting at elections as a civic duty. 
In 2014-2025 the following trend is becoming more visible: emerging of new party 
strategies. Parliament parties (those parties which participate in elections or even be-
come elected) become less popular among citizens. At the same time, new parties are 
emerging. New parties do not participate in elections. These parties do not set an aim to 
enter the parliament and, instead, go in the following directions: 
 Partly these new organizations will try to radicalize the situation; 
 Partly non-parliament parties will focus on performing social and rights-
defending projects. In this way they will try to influence situation in the 
country.  
Support of new non-parliament political parties will be growing slowly, along with 
growing Internet penetration and interest to alternative information sources. 
As a result of growing interest to politics, people will communicate with politicians 
more. Primarily it will be communication with new political forces. However, state offi-
cials will be less ready for a direct communication. 
Sometimes, due to emotional factors, radicalization is happening, leading to aggres-
sive protests and civic disobedience. The state suppresses such protests. Thus, the main 
models of the state-society relationships are related to confrontation: the model of “fight 
with an adversary” and the model of “civil disobedience”. The state also tries to control 
social movements and parties’ activities, especially those who aim to organize revolu-
tionary activities. 
Usually protests happen spontaneously, without any organization, because the state 
represses its main leaders. As protests become suppressed and living conditions become 
worse aggression in the society increases. Though the idea of external enemy is sup-
ported by the state propaganda, it influences people less and less, because of emergence 
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of alternative media channels. The state makes steps to perform more control over the 
Internet however it does not risk to close it totally for people. Due to the continuing 
growth of Internet penetration and generations change, more and more people use Inter-
net as a source of alternative information.    
Thus, though protest moods are rather high in the society, due to state control, they 
do not lead to a significant escalation of protests. Due to bigger repressions, 
crowdfunding is becoming a separate type of political activity. People support politi-
cians, parties and other social projects through crowdfunding. However, due to hard 
economic situation, this form of activity will not become universal. 
In the situation of economic crisis, migration into Russia of people from Central Asia 
declines, thus various chauvinist and ultranationalist movements become less popular. 
Overall, people’s civic self-consciousness in growing in 2014-2015, people become 
more eager to express their opinions, feel more responsibility, solidarity in the society 
increases. This is especially true for citizens of big cities, young people and intellectu-
als. Civic activity increases even at household level, for example, political consumption 
is becoming popular.    
Due to spread of IСT, signing petitions are becoming more mass. Though it does not 
influence much on political decision-making, it enhances creation of social networks 
and social movements spread. 
Along with worsening economic situation, more poor people and people in need 
emerge. As a result, networks of mutual aid emerge. Volunteering is growing. Due to 
multiple problems with governance, state become less effective in solving social prob-
lems, therefore NGOs take more important role in social help.  
In 2018 Vladimir Putin stays at power, partly because trust to him is still high in the 
society and partly because of limitations for opposition activity (so, citizens do not 
know much about alternatives). However, Vladimir Putin does not participate in the 
next president elections in 2024, due to age reasons and limitations set by a constitution. 
Therefore, the vacuum of power emerges and various elite groups start to fight for pow-
er involving the society in the game. Protest activity increases significantly in the years 
2023-2024.  
Overall, due to the increased participatory activities of citizens (such as participation 
in social movements, petitions, self-organization, volunteering, and participation in non-
traditional parties with low budgets) the consciousness and models of behavior among 
citizens is changing in 2014-2025. Particularly, many citizens adopt more proactive and 
less paternalistic attitude also many people learn to work in horizontal and flexible or-
ganizations, thus the leaning to authoritarian power in the society declines. 
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7.3.2 “Revolution” 
In this scenario, economic situation in Russia is worsening drastically in the follow-
ing years after 2014. This trend is conditioned by falling oil prices, economic isolation, 
wrong decisions in the economic governance etc. The state has difficulties with ful-
filling its social obligations: paying pensions, salaries to people working in state corpo-
rations and organizations (such as schools, hospitals etc.). As a result the number of 
poor people increases, the society becomes more aggressive towards the government 
and the president. At the same time, extra-rich people manage to secure their financial 
situation. Thus, social inequality in the society becomes more obvious and annoying.     
As a result the number of protest activity increases in the country. These protests 
start as peaceful but gradually they become more aggressive. Trust towards the govern-
ment and the president drastically declines. Citizens give up hope on influencing the 
situation through dialog with the state or through elections. As a result, the number of 
people aiming at changing ruling leader and elites by means of a revolutionary uprising 
increases.  
Opposition and revolutionary activity increases. As a result, the state increases the 
control on civic activity and repressions against its leaders. In addition, the state raises 
fear in the society through the media, by creating the image of an external enemy.  
Due to increased pressure on civic activity from the state, the role of organized forms 
of activity declines, as they become less effective. Thus, the role of political parties or 
NGOs declines. These organizations continue to exist, however become less significant 
in revolutionary activity. Instead, the role of spontaneous self-organization and non-
systemic opposition increases. Some oppositionists migrate abroad and try to influence 
on the internal situation in Russia form there. In addition, due to hard relations in inter-
national politics, some countries become interested in changing the political regime in 
Russia. They provide financial and media support for Russian opposition as a part of 
strategies of “stimulating democratic development of Russia”. 
Internet plays an important role as a means of uniting opposition activists, consolida-
tion their activities and providing information alternative to state media. 
By the presidential elections in 2018 the situation is tense. In the period close to pres-
idential elections, due to a serious provocation or some emotional event, for example, 
related to non-admission of a certain candidate to elections, leads to the beginning pro-
tests in big cities of the country. Police authorities try to cease the protest which leads to 
more aggressive behavior of protesters. Eventually, the protest transforms into an armed 
confrontation of citizens and law enforcement agencies. The situation follows the sce-
narios of the Ukrainian revolution in 2014 and ultimately leads to president’s resigna-
tion.   
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The situation after the revolution is difficult to project, however two possible devel-
opments of the situation are possible.  
In the first possible option, the country faces several years of civil war and drop of 
control by the center over regions of the country. Eventually the country disintegrates 
into several independent countries. 
Another possible development of the situation implies that after the revolution the in-
ternal situation in the country remains relatively peaceful (civil war does not begin), 
new president and parliament elections are conducted. The role of parties increases, new 
parties appear on a political arena. In this period political participation concentrates in 
such forms as party membership, voluntary work for a party and voting at elections. 
Demonstrations and social movements become also popular due to general politization 
of the society.     
Due to perturbations happened in the society, economic situation becomes even 
worse than it was before the revolution. People become poorer, while small share of 
people becomes richer. Thus, more and more people feel discontent and desire for a 
more fair social organization. This creates conditions for the spread of ideas of com-
munist society. The popularity of communist parties increases.  
Historically communist ideologists see their main goal in organization of a socialist 
revolution and setting the “dictatorship of the proletariat”. As soon as the number of 
poor people increases and working conditions of workers become worse, the society 
becomes more “proletarized”. People become eager to fight social equality through pro-
tests and revolution.  
The desired vision for the communist society, shared by people, has the following el-
ements: 
 State governance should be conducted in people’s interests. 
 Stimulating people’s democracy: citizens should be involved into governance 
through participation in political parties, voting at elections, volunteer work, 
signing petitions, social movements and participation in NGOs. 
 Using media as a tool for educating people, breeding new values in the socie-
ty. 
 Control over Internet. 
 Fighting against the bourgeoisie.       
As soon as the communist ideology becomes more popular in the society, the condi-
tions for a socialist revolution become more favorable. Eventually, the change of politi-
cal regime happens for the second time, with the establishment of the communist re-
gime in Russia by 2025.  
Overall, in terms of political participation the scenario “revolution” projects the rise 
of protest activity (both peaceful and aggressive) and spontaneous self-organization as 
key forms of citizens’ political participation in Russia in 2014-2025.    
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7.3.3 “Engagement in cooperation with the state” 
In 2014-2016 years Russia overcomes a serious economic downturn due to declining 
oil prices on the global market and hard situation in international relations. However, 
during these years the country manages to succeed in new (not oil-based) business areas 
and important industries, so that oil revenues become less critical as a source of income. 
Structure of economy improves and becomes less dependent on import of food, medi-
cine and other products. Since 2016 global economy shows signs of recovery from the 
economic decline, global production grows, which leads to higher global demand for 
fuels. Thus, oil prices increase. Confrontation of Russia with western countries (escalat-
ed in 2014) is not completely overcome; however, the situation remains relatively stable 
and without dramatic armed conflicts. 
During the period of difficult economic situation, the majority of citizens support 
government policies. Overall, after the splash of interest to politics and opposition 
movements happened in 2011-2014 years, the following years are characterized by con-
solidation of the society and the shift of social attention to economic news and prob-
lems. This creates less pressure on governance from citizens, protest activity significant-
ly declines. Less and less people talk about revolutionary power change. If protests hap-
pen, they usually remain peaceful.  
Liberalization of elections’ legislation, happened in 2012 (particularly, a simplified 
procedure for registration of political parties was introduced), lead to the emergence of a 
large number of new political parties by 2014. By the next parliament elections (in the 
year 2016), competitiveness of existing parties is tested and part of newly created par-
ties disintegrate by parliament elections in 2016. Nevertheless, several new parties par-
ticipate it parliament elections together with old parties. However, during the period 
2016-2025 not many new parties appear on political scene and membership in parties 
does not attract significantly more new people.   
Trust in election is improving, due to better possibilities for elections observation 
(video cameras at every election site, introduced back in 2012), activity of volunteers 
observing elections, emergence of new political parties and president candidates at all 
levels (federal and local). Therefore, elections turnout is growing in the period from 
2014-2025. People in Russia see voting at elections as their duty as citizens and a way 
to express their support to the state.   
At the same time, people are becoming more active at non-parliament forms of polit-
ical participation.  
The state continues the policy of developing partnership with non-governmental or-
ganizations in solving social problems; therefore the role of NGOs is increasing. The 
overall number of NGOs declines after the years 2012-2014, primarily because some 
international non-governmental organizations leave the country. However, NGOs origi-
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nated in Russia continue to work and create value for the society. NGOs experience an 
inflow of volunteers and money donations from citizens. Volunteering becomes a norm 
for the society. The state supports the activity of citizens through legislation, state grants 
and education. 
Due to the newly created opportunities for local governance, the activity of citizens 
increases on the local level. People feel more responsibility for their communities and 
tend to self-organize on a local level to solve actual problems. People become and feel 
more empowered to participate in decision-level at local level. 
Thus, by 2025 political participation in Russia combines traditional forms of political 
participation (primarily voting at elections, while party membership becomes less popu-
lar), with forms of “engaged citizenship”. Increased feeling of citizens’ responsibility, 
together with improved structure of the economy, brings living conditions in Russia to a 
new level. 
7.4 Desirable futures of state-society relationships 
In addition to probable scenarios for future development of political participation, ex-
perts were asked to reflect on their desired future by 2025 and ways, how this desired 
future could be achieved. More concretely, the following questions were asked: 
В9. Imagine a desirable for you scenario of the future. Which models of state-
citizens relationships in Russia would play a key role in this scenario? 
В10. In your opinion, what should be done (and who should do it), or which 
events should happen in the future, so that the desirable scenario would ac-
tualize? 
Both questions were asked only in the first round. 
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Figure 12 Desired model (several answers were possible) 
As shown at Figure 12, the majority of experts would like to see cooperation in state-
civil society relationship and higher role of civil society in decision-making in the coun-
try (meaning models ”state support”, ”citizens as architects” and ”dialog model”). At 
the same time, some experts would prefer to see more elements of citizens’ independ-
ence from the state. However, it was noted that it is not the model of relationships 
which fits Russia in reality, because Russia is very much dependant from the central 
government, due to geographical/climatic conditions of the country and historical rea-
sons. Some experts see revolutionary scenario as the desired future, thus the model of 
“civil disobedience” is also present in the Figure 12.  
Opinions expressed by experts about ways to achieve the desired future were quite 
different and can be classified into the following categories: 
1. Revolution. This vision implies that the achievement of the desired future is 
possible only through mass protest and revolution:   
a. “I am afraid, there is no evolutionary scenario for Russia any longer” 
(Interviewee E) 
b. “The masses have to rebel” etc. (Interviewee C) 
2. Evolution of people and social relations. However, there was an alternative 
opinion saying that evolution of people should happen: they should become 
more active at the local level. Apart from that more profound changes in the so-
ciety (which will happed along with evolutionary development) are also needed:  
a. “Severity of social contradictions, inevitable under capitalism, at a cer-
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96 
ditions of society and the individual. This will entail a qualitative change 
in the social structure.” (Interviewee D) 
3. Activity and an effective work of social associations. This vision implies that 
people’s effective self-organization into various associations would ultimately 
lead to a desired future. 
a. “People’s self-organization into political and civic associations”, “Pub-
lic institutions must prove their effectiveness”. (Interviewee H) 
4. Increasing the role of civil society in governance. This position implies the the 
state should step away from authoritarian trends in governance, “vertical power” 
and give more freedom and opportunities for civil society This can be done 
through state reforms. Citations from interviews: 
a. “Diversion of the state from authoritarian model or governance” (Inter-
viewee F); 
b. “Reforms, aimed at strengthening the role of civil society institutions, are 
necessary. Promotion of civic engagement of the population, given the 
high potential of the Russian civil society, will allow hope for a qualita-
tive change in the social and political life”. (Interviewee I); 
c. “State must be ready to give some of the functions of public institutions, 
such as through outsourcing. (this experience in the region are begin-
ning to be used)” (Interviewee J); 
d. “Stimulation of the work of civil sector, enhancement of legislation” (In-
terviewee K). 
5. Leaders change. Other experts noted that change in state-society relations is on-
ly possible after the change of state and opposition leaders. 
6. And, finally, some experts expressed pessimism that by 2025 the desired future 
can be achieved at all. The achievement is possible only in case of a miracle.  
To sum up, there are various visions of the desirable futures among experts however 
most experts see the desirable future by 2025 in active role of civic society and its coop-
erative partnership with the state. Fewer experts would also prefer to minimize state-
society relationships and see civil society independent from the state. When compared 
with experts’ visions of state-society relationship models in the recent past (see Figure 
8) we can conclude that the desired situation is different from the situation existing in 
the recent past. Experts proposed the different ways by which the desired future can be 
achieved, such as: revolution, evolution of the society, active initiative of social associa-
tions, the change of governance model, and change of state and opposition leaders.   
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7.5 Conclusions of scenario building 
This chapter focused on building scenarios for the future on the basis of Delphi study 
results.  
Multiple factors (technological, economic, social and political) influenced on politi-
cal participations in the past and in the future. On average, experts’ estimations project 
the rise of influence strength of crowdfunding and economic factors (particularly eco-
nomic crisis) on political participation.     
There are almost no clearly predetermined factors for the future of political participa-
tion. The most predetermined element is that in the period between 2014 and 2025 a 
generation change will take place, and younger generation will become more active in 
social and political life. However, it is uncertain, how generations change will impact 
on political participation. The other critical uncertainties include, for example, whether 
the state will adopt a censorship/limitations policy for the Internet? And how severe 
economic crisis will be?  
When evaluating the situation in political participation in the recent past, experts es-
timate that the highest share of Russians participate through traditional, “formal parlia-
ment” types of political participation and fewer citizens participate through more en-
gaged, “latent” forms. It terms of most prevalent forms of state-society relationships, 
experts evaluate that models of confrontation and state dominance exist in the most cas-
es. Cooperative partnership and “no relationships” models can be also found in the so-
cial and political life however their prevalence is lower.  
The chapter presents three possible scenarios of how forms of political participation 
and models of state-society relationships models may develop in the future: “engaged 
citizens in the authoritarian state”, “revolution” and “engagement in cooperation with 
the state”. Two of these scenarios refer to two opinion clusters, which were identified 
through cluster analysis of Delphi study material, and one scenario is based on qualita-
tive analysis of the outliers’ views (the process of analysis was described in Chapter 6).  
In addition, the vision of desirable futures is presented. It was noted that vision of the 
desirable future of relationship models is almost opposite to the situation which was 
observed in the recent past. 
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8 DISCUSSION 
The present study used a scenarios building approach in studying and describing alter-
native futures of citizens’ political participation in Russia in 2014-2025.  
The current study determines the object of the present study as “political participa-
tion”, which will be understood in a broad sense as activities of people, whose are living 
in the country, to influence social situation and political decision-making in this coun-
try. Politics is regarded as achieving social goals, and not related to struggle for power. 
Similar terms (such as “civic engagement”) if used in the present work, are used as syn-
onyms of “political participation”. 
The study focuses on two aspects of political participation: forms of participation and 
relationships with the state. Both of these aspects are clearly operationalized in the pre-
sent paper. The study adopted a classification of political participation forms, which 
was developed by Ekman and Amnå (2012) and classifies all possible forms into the 
following categories: manifest political particiation (basically, these are forms which 
aim at influencing governmental decisions in a certain way), latent political 
aprticipation (generally, it is civic activity which does not directly influence decision-
making of the government) and non-participation. As for state-society relationships 
models, the current master’s thesis used the framework developed on the basis of 
Jakobson’s (2008) classification, and includes the following categories: cooperative 
partnership, state dominance, confrontation and no relationships. 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990s, citizens of new 
state – Russian Federation, got more opportunities for excretion of their civic initiative 
and more ways for political participation. Therefore, civic activity in the society in-
creased. However, the future presents uncertainty. It is projected that the years 2014-
2025 will not be stable for Russia in economic and political sense. Therefore, it is im-
portant to analyze alternative directions of the societal development.  
The study conducts explorative scenarios building, meaning that the research is not 
related to a concrete decision and, instead, it is aims at general studying of the phenom-
enon. Also, a scenario is perceived as story about the future (“history of the future”) 
rather than a snapshot of the future (“future image”). The present study aims at studying 
both possible and preferable futures.  
Disaggregative policy Delphi approach is used for data collection. In essence it 
means collective approach to scenarios building where Delphi is utilized as a method of 
organizing a group communication. Scenarios are created out of the analysis of qualita-
tive and quantitative material obtained through a Delphi process. Overall, Delphi ap-
proach showed its effectiveness in organizing collective communication of experts with 
diverse, sometimes contradictory views and located geographically in different places.      
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Three resulting scenarios outlined three possible futures for political participation in 
Russia in 2014-2025 years: 
 The first scenario “Engaged citizens in the authoritarian state” projects the con-
centration of citizens’ activity in manifest political participation, increase of par-
ties’ activity. However, the parties themselves are changing: the influence of old 
parliament parties declines, while the popularity of new, non-parliament and 
even radical parties increases. In this scenario citizens learn to work in horizon-
tal organizations (parties of new types, networked social movements), pos-
sessing little resources for their activity. As a result, adherence to authoritarian 
governance style becomes less popular in the society. Relationships models be-
tween the society and the state can be characterized as “confrontation” in some 
cases (due to the growth of alternative parties and protest activity) and “coopera-
tion” in other cases (mainly in providing social services for people in need, 
NGOs take part of state’s functions). 
 The second scenario describes a revolutionary process in 2014-2025 years. Con-
sequently, state-society relationships are characterized largely by “confronta-
tion” model.  
 Finally, the third scenario “Engagement in cooperation with the state” describes 
a story in which citizens consolidate around state power, and mainly support 
government policies, as well as trust more to elections. At the same time, civic 
activity increases, however, it is focused on latent participation forms, especially 
on local level. State-society relationships are characterized primarily by “coop-
eration” and “paternalistic” models. 
All three scenarios project growth of interest into politics among Russians in 2014-
2025. Also, all three scenarios include the factor of “economic crisis” as important 
though imply various depth of crisis development. It should be noted that assessing a 
probability of these scenarios was not a task for the current study and may be a subject 
for the future research. 
Overall, the study clearly described concepts, tools and methods which were used at 
each step of the research process. Thus, the research can be discussed openly and criti-
cized at all steps of the study, which is important for an academic approach to futures 
studied. At the same time, there are certain limitations of the study, which should be 
outlined. 
Firstly, responsible projecting of the future and building scenarios for political par-
ticipation is not possible in isolation from social, economic and political context. Partic-
ularly, in the present study economic factors were evaluated as the most important fac-
tors by most experts. Thus, scenarios would be more reliable if the study involved also 
experts in economics and international politics. Ideally the separate work on building 
projections for economic and political development could be done separately prior to 
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building scenarios of political participation. Due to this limitation, not in all cases the 
logic of scenarios described in the current work can be completely justified. More 
knowledge of cause and effect relationships in needed for that.  
In general the attempt to project a complex issue, leading to the necessity to list all 
possible factors, to study all major trends, highlights the need for better understanding 
of cause and effect relationships. Thus, futures studies makes visible those areas which 
are not studied well enough. As a result, new research questions may emerge for various 
scientists. In relation to the present study, for example, more studies about younger gen-
eration and its impact on political participation are needed (especially better understand-
ing of digital natives). These are areas which could be potentially interesting for social 
and political scientists as areas for research. 
Secondly, the study analyses political participation in a very general way, trying to 
identify the general trends and possible developments. However, multiple forms of po-
litical participation also have their own logic of development and could be analyzed in a 
more focused way. It was noticed throughout the study, that there is very little infor-
mation on some forms of political participation, for example, on political consumption, 
volunteering, civil disobedience, support of party ideology and others. Studying these 
participation forms more thoroughly could be one of the directions for the further re-
search. 
The third limitation of the study is that not all geographical areas of Russia were 
covered. Russia has many regions and multi-national population. Mentality and behav-
ior strategies of citizens living in different regions may vary significantly from each 
other. Thus, it would be beneficial for the study political participation more precisely in 
different regions. However, it was not possible in the scope of the current study. In ad-
dition, we realize that not all areas of expertise have been covered because of study 
work limitations.    
And finally, the described scenarios were not assessed by participants. Additional 
collective work on assessing scenarios and elaboration of their logic would be beneficial 
for the result. 
Overall, I could agree with Glenn, who wrote that scenario building process is par-
ticularly useful for its participants. (Glenn, n/a (b), 18.) The process of scenarios build-
ing seems to help its participants to articulate and reflect their views about the past, pre-
sent and future, to clarify possible opportunities for development of the phenomenon, to 
develop their attitude to alternative futures. Participants of the study were highly moti-
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APPENDIX 1: DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRES 
Both questionnaires were created and distributed in Russian language. Below is English 
translation. 




Thank you for participation in the study “The future of political participation in Russia in 2025”. This is 
the first round questionnaire of a two-round Delphi study. 
 
When answering the questions, please, rely on your own judgments and vision of the future. It is your 
personal opinions on the matter which is the most valuable for the research. You may leave comments to 
your answers or to the questions, while responding, if you want.       
  
Your responses will be analyzed in a generalized way. If citations are used, they will be used anonymous-
ly. Prior to the second round of you will be able to read a short report with the responses of all partici-
pants of the first round, in a generalized form.  
 
Thank you for your precious contribution! 
Part 1. Evaluation of driving forces 
В1. In your opinion, how strong has been the influence of the following factors on political partici-
pation
12
 in Russia in the past 14 years (2000-2014)?  
If you want to add any important factors, which are not included in a list, write them down in the bot-
tom lines of the table. 
Evaluate each factor in the column B1 of the table below, using the scale:   
1 – Unimportant, no influence 
2 – Almost no influence 
3 – Weak influence 
4 – Moderate influence 
5 – Influence higher than average 
6 – Strong influence 
7 – Very strong influence 
 
В2. For those factors, which influence was evaluated as moderate, higher than average, strong or 
very strong (variants 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the question B1) explain in your own words, what kind of im-
pact on political participation each of these factors made in the past 14 years (2000-2014)? 
Write explanations in the column B2 in the table below  
                                                 
12 
Political participation means the activity of people, living in a country, which is consciously or uncon-
sciously directed towards influence on political and social issues – issues of life organization in a country 





Strength of influence 
В2 
Explanation of influence 
1. 
The spread of information and com-
munication technologies (Internet, 
social networks, smart phones) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. 




1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. Generations change 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
4. Spreading values of individualism 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
5. Migration (into and out of Russia) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
6. Multi-nationality 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
7. Growing socio-economic inequalities 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
8. 
Legislative regulation of civic life by 
the state  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. Corruption 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
10. Economic crisis 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
11. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
12. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
13. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
 
В3. In your opinion, how strong will be the influence of the following factors on political participa-
tion in Russia in the future (years 2014-2025)? 
If you want to add important factors, which are not included in a list, write them down in the bottom 
lines of the table. 
Evaluate each factor in the column B3 of the table below, using the scale:   
1 – Will not influence at all 
2 – Almost will not influence 
3 – Influence will be weak 
4 – Influence will be moderate 
5 – Influence will be higher than average 
6 – Will influence strongly 
7 – Influence will be very strong 
 
В4. For those factors, the future influence of which you evaluated as moderate, higher than aver-
age, strong or very strong (variants 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the question B3) explain in your own words, 
what kind of impact on political participation each of these factors will make in the future (2014-
2025)? 





Strength of influence 
В4 
Explanation of influence 
1. 
Spread of information and communi-
cation technologies (Internet, social 
networks, smart phones) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. 




1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
                                                 
13
 Crowd funding is a cooperation of many people, who voluntarily unite their money or other resources 
together, usually through the Internet, to support activity/projects of other people of organizations. Money 
collection may have different goals, such as: to help to people who suffered from natural disasters, expen-
sive treatment of serious diseases, to support political campaigns, to finance start ups and so on. 
14
 Crowdfunding is a cooperation of many people, who voluntarily unite their money or other resources 
together, usually through the Internet, to support activity/projects of other people of organizations. Money 
collection may have different goals, such as: to help to people who suffered from natural disasters, expen-
sive treatment of serious diseases, to support political campaigns, to finance start ups and so on. 
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3. Generations change 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
4. Spreading values of individualism 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
5. Migration (into and out of Russia) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
6. Multi-nationality 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
7. Growing socio-economic inequalities 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
8. 
Legislation regulation of civic life by 
the state  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. Corruption 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
10. Economic crisis 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
11. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
12. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
13. Other (write down) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
Part 2. Present and future forms of political participation 
В5. Please estimate, which share of Russian citizens, approximately, have been involved (at least 
from time to time) in different forms of political participation in the past 4-5 years.  
If you want to add other important forms of participation, which are not included in a list, write them 
down in the bottom lines of the table. 
Write % against of each participation form in column B5 of the table below. 
В6. Imagine the possible scenario for the future. Under this scenario, how the involvement in these 
forms of participation (the share of population involved) will change in the next 10-11 years (2014-
2025)? 
Evaluate each participation form in the column B6 in the table below using the scale: 
1 – Involvement will dramatically decrease 
2 – Involvement will decrease a lot 
3 – Involvement will somewhat decrease 
4 – Involvement will not change 
5 – Involvement will somewhat increase 
6 – Involvement will increase a lot 
7 – Involvement will dramatically increase 
 
 
Forms of participation 
B5 
% of involved 
citizens in the last 
4-5 years 
B6 
Change of involvement 
in the future 
1. 
Perceiving politics as important and following 
political news 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
2. 
Active interest in politics (discussions of political 
issues with others, active Internet political partic-
ipation etc.) 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. Identifying with a certain ideology or party  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. Being a party member  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. Voting at elections  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. 
Contacting politicians or their representatives 
(personally or through on-line forms of commu-
nication) 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
7. 
Donating money for political parties or selected 
candidates 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8. Voluntary work for a party  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
9. Political consumption
15
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
10. Signing petitions  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
11. Involvement in social movements  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
                                                 
15
 Political consumption – is the consumption of conscious avoiding of certain products/services con-
sumption aimed at demonstration of a certain political position or a value. 
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12. 
Participation in peaceful protests, demonstra-
tions, strikes and so on. 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
13. Participation in violent demonstrations  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
14. Civil disobedience
16
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
15. Donating money to charity or NGOs  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
16. 
Short-term self-organization for solving urgent 
issues 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
17. Membership in NGO  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
18. 
Voluntary work for NGOs, orphanage houses, 
homes for elderly etc. 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
19. Other (write down)  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Part 3. Present and future models of state-citizens relationships 
В7. Statements in the table below describe the possible models of relationships between the state 
and citizens (or association of citizens). Please, evaluate, how often these models of relationships 
could be observed in Russia in the past 4-5 years.  
Please, mark your answer in the column B7, in the table below, using the scale:   
1 – Was not observed at all 
2 – Was observed rarely 
3 – Was observed from time to time 
4 – Was observed often 
5 – Was observed very often (or in all situations) 
 
В8. Imagine a possible scenario for the future. How models of state-citizens relationships in Russia 
will be changing under this scenario during the next  10-11 years (2014-2025)?  
Mark your answers in the column В8, in the table below, using the scale: 
1 – Model prevalence will dramatically decrease  
2 – Model prevalence will decrease significantly 
3 – Model prevalence will somewhat decrease 
4 – Situation will remain the same as in the present time 
5 – Model prevalence will somewhat increase 
6 – Model prevalence will significantly increase  






tionships in the 
past 4-5 years 
В8 
State-citizens relation-
ships in the future 
1. 
Government supports citizens’ activity through 
concrete actions (for example, legislation, educa-
tion etc.) 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
2. 
Government admits the importance of citizen’s 
political participation for the effective democratic 
development of the country, and maintains the 
dialog with citizens and citizens associations on a 
regular basis 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. 
Associations of citizens form political agenda, 
propose solutions for problems, participate in 
reformations of governmental institutions 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. 
The state uses civic associations as the means to 
perform control over the society 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. 
State does not pay attention to civic associations, as 
well as to civic and political participation. It does 
not interfere and does not help 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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6. 
Government sees active political participation as 
dangerous for the state and tries to make life of 
activists harder 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
7. 
Civic rights and freedoms are violated by the state, 
that’s why citizens take part in unsanctioned 
demonstrations and other actions which provoke 
repressive actions from the state 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8. 
Citizens self-organize and perform social projects 
independently and without control from the state. 
The state does not have means to control citizens. 
1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
9. Other (write) 1   2   3   4   5 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
В9. Imagine a desirable for you scenario of the future. Which models of state-citizens relationships 
in Russia would play a key role in this scenario? 
If some important models are not represented in the list below, please, write them down in bottom lines 
of the table.   
Mark one of more statements in the table below. 
В9 Relationships models 
1. 
Government supports citizens’ activity through concrete actions (for example, legislation, edu-
cation etc.) 
2. 
Government admits the importance of citizen’s political participation for the effective demo-
cratic development of the country, and maintains the dialog with citizens and citizens associa-
tions on a regular basis 
3. 
Associations of citizens form political agenda, propose solutions for problems, participate in 
reformations of governmental institutions 
4. The state uses civic associations as the means to perform control over the society 
5. 
State does not pay attention to civic associations, as well as to civic and political participation. 
It does not interfere and does not help 
6. 
Government sees active political participation as dangerous for the state and tries to make life 
of activists harder 
7. 
Civic rights and freedoms are violated by the state, that’s why citizens take part in unsanctioned 
demonstrations and other actions which provoke repressive actions from the state 
8. 
Citizens self-organize and perform social projects independently and without control from the 
state. The state does not have means to control citizens. 
9. Other (write) 
 
В10. In your opinion, what should be done (and who should do it), or which events should happen 
in the future, so that the desirable scenario would actualize? 
________________________________________________________ 
Thank you very much for your responses!  
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Thank you for your responses on the first round questionnaire of the study “The future of political partici-
pation in Russia in 2025”. Please, read the first round feedback report before responding on this ques-
tionnaire. 
 
Questionnaire for the second round is based on the questionnaire for the first round therefore questions in 
them are partially repeated. However, your responses may differ from the ones you gave in the first 
round. You can also change your argumentation, add new comments.  
 
All responses will be analyzed and presented in a generalized way. If citations are used, they will be used 
anonymously. 
 




Thank you for your precious contribution! 
 
 
Part 1. Evaluation of driving forces 
С1. In your opinion, how strong will be the influence of the following factors on political participa-
tion in Russia in the future (years 2014-2025)? 
=> New factors, added after the first round, are marked with grey color. 
Evaluate each factor in the column C1 of the table below, using the scale:   
1 – Will not influence at all 
2 – Almost will not influence 
3 – Influence will be weak 
4 – Influence will be moderate 
5 – Influence will be higher than average 
6 – Will influence strongly 
7 – Influence will be very strong 
С2. For those factors, the future influence of which you evaluated as moderate, higher than aver-
age, strong or very strong (variants 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the question C1) explain in your own words, 
what kind of impact on political participation each of these factors will make in the future (2014-
2025)? 




Strength of influence 
C2 
Explanation of influence 
1. 
Spread of information and communica-
tion technologies (Internet, social net-
works, smart phones) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. Emerging possibilities for crowdfunding 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
3. Generations change 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
4. Spreading values of individualism 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
5. Migration (into and out of Russia) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
6. Multi-nationality 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
7. Growing socio-economic inequalities 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
8. 
Legislation regulation of civic activity 
by the state  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. Corruption 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
10. Economic crisis 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
11. Declining elections trust 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
12. Emotional factors (events causing a 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
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splash of emotions in the society) 
13. State grant programs for civil society 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
14. Confrontation with western countries 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
15. Authoritarian tendencies in governance 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
16. Idea of external enemy 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
17. Political repressions 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
18. State media policy 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
Part 2. Present and future forms of political participation 
С3. Imagine the possible scenario for the future. Under this scenario, how the involvement in these 
forms of participation (the share of population involved) will change in the next 10-11 years (2014-
2025)? 
Evaluate each participation form in the column C3 in the table below using the scale: 
1 – Involvement will dramatically decrease 
2 – Involvement will decrease a lot 
3 – Involvement will somewhat decrease 
4 – Involvement will not change 
5 – Involvement will somewhat increase 
6 – Involvement will increase a lot 
7 – Involvement will dramatically increase 
 
С4. Please, give argumentation of the score you gave when answering question C3. 
Write explanations in the column C4 in the table below 
 
Forms of participation 
С3 
Change of involvement 
in the future 
С4 
Argumentation 
1. Perceiving politics as important and following politi-
cal news 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
2. 
Active interest in politics (discussions of political 
issues with others, active Internet political participa-
tion etc.) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. Identifying with a certain ideology or party 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
4. Being a party member 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
5. Voting at elections 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
6. Contacting politicians or their representatives (per-
sonally or through on-line forms of communication) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
7. Donating money for political parties or selected 
candidates 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
8. Voluntary work for a party 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
9. Political consumption  1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
10. Signing petitions 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
11. Involvement in social movements 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
12. Participation in peaceful protests, demonstrations, 
strikes and so on. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
13. Participation in violent demonstrations 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
14. Civil disobedience 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
15. Donating money to charity or NGOs 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
16. Short-term self-organization for solving urgent is-
sues 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
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17. Membership in NGO 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
18. Voluntary work for NGOs, orphanage houses, homes 
for elderly etc. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
19. 
Passive protest – demonstrative non-participation in 
elections  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
Part 3. Present and future models of state-citizens relationships 
C5. Imagine a possible scenario for the future. How models of state-citizens relationships in Russia 
will be changing under this scenario during the next  10-11 years (2014-2025)? 
Mark your answers in the column C6, in the table below, using the scale: 
1 – Model prevalence will dramatically decrease  
2 – Model prevalence will decrease significantly 
3 – Model prevalence will somewhat decrease 
4 – Situation will remain the same as in the present time 
5 – Model prevalence will somewhat increase 
6 – Model prevalence will significantly increase  
7 – Model prevalence will dramatically increase 
 
C6. Please, give argumentation of the score you gave when answering question C5. 









Government supports citizens’ activity through 
concrete actions (for example, legislation, educa-
tion etc.) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. 
Government admits the importance of citizen’s 
political participation for the effective democratic 
development of the country, and maintains the 
dialog with citizens and citizens associations on a 
regular basis 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. 
Associations of citizens form political agenda, 
propose solutions for problems, participate in 
reformations of governmental institutions 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
4. 
The state uses civic associations as the means to 
perform control over the society 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
5. 
State does not pay attention to civic associations, 
as well as to civic and political participation. It 
does not interfere and does not help 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
6. 
Government sees active political participation as 
dangerous for the state and tries to make life of 
activists harder 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
7. 
Civic rights and freedoms are violated by the 
state, that’s why citizens take part in unsanctioned 
demonstrations and other actions which provoke 
repressive actions from the state 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
8. 
Citizens self-organize and perform social projects 
independently and without control from the state. 
The state does not have means to control citizens. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 




APPENDIX 2: FEEDBACK REPORT 
 
Similarly to Delhi questionnaires, feedback report was initially created and distributed in Russian language. Below is its English translation. 
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